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This thesis examines the feasibility of economic incentives for reforestation, 
with improved water quality being one potential benefit, in the Fond D’or watershed of 
Saint Lucia. Population growth, economic development, and the onset of climate 
change have decreased the environmental quality in Small Island Developing State 
(SIDS) while increasing risk to the islands’ water security. The unique topography and 
geology of Caribbean island nations contribute to the challenges of managing 
freshwater resources. The governments of SIDS often lack the human and financial 
resources to provide potable water for their citizens, as well as to monitor and enforce 
environmental regulations limiting land use in watersheds. Therefore, a new approach 
to watershed management in Saint Lucia is imperative for the provision of valuable 
ecosystem services at the local, regional, and global scales. Payments for ecosystem 
services (PES) are a promising approach to the protection and maintenance of public 
ecosystem services where there is little incentive for private landowners to provide 
them.     
 
The first article explores household willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reforestation 
in Fond D’or watershed. The  contingent valuation method was used to obtain 
residents’ WTP for a hypothetical scenario in which an increase in water users’ fees are 
used to fund a program where farmers in the upper watershed are compensated for 
taking land near water sources out of agricultural production for reforestation. The 
findings from 294 household surveys provide a description of the state of water quality 
and quantity in the Fond D’or, domestic water uses and sources, as well as attitudes and 
opinions about current water service. Bivariate analyses were performed to identify 
underlying factors that influence WTP, revealing that increased WTP is not a result of 
higher education and income. Rather, residence in a particular community group likely 
influences opinions about water, ultimately shaping WTP. Lastly, I discuss WTP in 
terms of its potential contribution to a PES scheme in Saint Lucia; WTP by local 
beneficiaries represents one potential funding source for PES mechanisms as well as 
public support for environmental improvement programs. 
 
The second article describes a methodological approach to constructing a PES 
scheme in the Fond D’or watershed. Of the five environmental policy approaches—
prescription, penalties, property rights, persuasion, and payments—payment is likely 
to be the most feasible method to influence private land management decisions for the 
provision of ecosystem services for the public good. This article draws upon existing 
PES schemes for hydrological services around the globe to provide key lessons for 
expanding the use of the instrument to Saint Lucia. I apply these lessons to the social, 
political, and institutional context of Saint Lucia, identifying opportunities for and 
challenges to developing local or regional payment schemes for ecosystem services in 
the Fond D'or watershed. I outline the steps to constructing a PES and recommend 
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CHAPTER 1: COMPREHENSIVE LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
1.1 Introduction 
The term “ecosystem services” is a new expression for an old idea (Brauman, 
Daily, Duarte, & Mooney, 2007). Stocks of natural capital—both biotic and abiotic—
yield valuable flows of goods and services; ecosystem services are those ecosystem 
functions that are of value to humans (Daly & Farley, 2004).  
Ecosystem structure provides, most perceptibly, raw materials available for 
conversion into market goods. Less concrete are the services delivered through 
ecosystem processes: flood control, waste absorption, nutrient cycling, water and air 
purification, etc. Many of these ecosystem services are purely non-rival and non-
excludable (a.k.a. public goods)—rival meaning that the consumption of the service by 
one party prevents its consumption by others and excludable meaning that the service 
can be owned and the owner can prevent others from using the service (Daly & Farley, 
2004). Public goods generally fall outside the realm of the market economy, so while 
these services sustain human health and well-being, resource extraction for economic 
production is rewarded in the marketplace over the conservation of the ecosystem 
structure that provides them. Rising populations, unsustainable rates of consumption 
and continued neglect have increased the scarcity of ecosystem services around the 
globe.  
Conserving or enhancing ecosystem services requires forgoing alternative 
values and land uses, such as timber extraction or agricultural production (Pagiola, 
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Bishop, & Landell-Mills, 2002). As a result, ecosystem services, particularly those 
public in nature, are not given appropriate consideration in policy decisions. This 
occurs because public goods remain outside the realm of the market, lack an economic 
value, and are unaccounted for in policy and management decisions (Costanza et al., 
1997; Kumar, 2005; Naidoo & Ricketts, 2006).  
Public ecosystem services often result from private management decisions. 
Generally, private landowners will not provide sufficient quantities of public goods 
acting in their own self-interest and, oftentimes, government intervention by way of 
subsidies, taxes, regulation, modification of property rights, or direct provision is 
necessary to manage pure public goods. Given this quandary, conservation practitioners 
seek to provide incentives for landowners who would otherwise destroy ecosystems 
and species, to preserve them. These conservation approaches range from direct to 
indirect depending on the conservation objectives and types of interventions (Figure 





Ferraro & Kiss (2002) 
Figure 1.1: Conservation investments in biodiversity ranging from indirect to direct  
Direct approaches, like conservation easements or performance-based 
payments, address the issue that individuals seek what is in their best interest by 
aligning incentives to conserve with society as a whole (Ferraro & Simpson, 2001; 
Pagiola et al., 2005). This approach recognizes the trade-offs associated with 
conservation and seek to bridge conflicting interests by means of compensation 
(Wunder, 2007). Direct approaches may be more successful in achieving conservation 
goals than indirect approaches because they offer comprehensible links between well-
being, individual behavior, and ecosystem conservation (Ferraro, 2001). This approach 
may also be more efficient than command-and-control measures, particularly in 
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developing countries where the governments lack the human and economic resources to 
enforce rules regarding the use of a resource. 
1.1.1 Payments for Ecosystem Services 
Payments for ecosystem, or environmental, services (PES) are an innovative 
method of using economic incentives to promote land management activities on private 
land for the provision of public ecosystem services. This type of intervention is less 
direct than conservation easements but more direct than eco-tourism or Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) (Figure 1.2), which have been 
described as "conservation by distraction" (Ferraro & Kiss, 2002). PES mechanisms 
directly address the incentive to convert or degrade natural ecosystems by paying the 
landowner at least as much as he/she would have received from converting the habitat 
to some other land use. Countries in parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, as well 
as North America and Europe, are using this approach for environmental protection and 
improvement.  
PES for hydrological services is a common application of the PES tool. 
Ecosystems normally deliver multiple benefits simultaneously (McMichael et al., 2005) 
and watersheds, in particular, provide well-recognized services like water quality, water 
table regulation, aquatic habitat protection, and soil contaminant control (Landell-Mills 
& Porras, 2002; Scherr et al., 2004). For this reason, many national parks and protected 
areas were initially created for watershed protection (Scherr et al., 2004).  
Almost 30 percent of the world’s largest cities depend on forested watersheds 
for their water supply (Scherr, White, Khare, Inbar, & Molnar, 2004). As water demand 
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is expected to double, even triple, in the next 50 years, especially in developing 
countries, the prospect for increased demand and increased payment for watershed 
services is vast (Scherr et al., 2004). Many countries have already arrived at watershed 
PES arrangements for specific services that are strategic at the local (e.g. downstream 
agricultural users), regional (e.g. urban water supply) or national (e.g. hydropower 
plant) scale (Robertson & Wunder, 2005).  
The opportunities are great but there are trade-offs associated with watershed 
PES development (Pagiola et al., 2002). While landowners in the upper watershed 
maintain forests on their land and provide clean water to downstream users, they are 
foregoing benefits from harvesting timber, grazing livestock, or cultivating crops. If the 
land is denuded, reforestation requires limiting land use in the upper watershed, which 
results in lost revenue for the landowners. There also exist issues surrounding the 
equitable distribution of benefits. In a watershed, the benefits accrue disproportionately 
to downstream water users. In light of these trade-offs between conservation, 
productivity and equity, institutions must be developed so that all parties benefit 
(Pagiola et al., 2002).  
While many nations have implemented successful PES schemes, most widely 
known is Costa Rica’s successful pagos por servicios ambientales (PSA or Payments 
for Environmental Services) program. The Costa Rican government implemented this 
nation-wide program in 1996 to compensate landowners for maintaining forests on 
their lands or for reforesting degraded lands, thereby supporting livelihoods while 
promoting conservation. The national PSA program is primarily funded through a tax 
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on fuel sales and Global Environment Facility (GEF) grants, whereas several local or 
regional watershed PES schemes are funded through water users’ fees. Similarly, a 
watershed scheme in Quito, Ecuador relies on voluntary payments by water users to 
supply FONAG, its water fund (Echavarria, 2002; Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002); New 
York City water users’ compensate upstream rural agricultural communities for 
management practices that provide clean drinking water (Landell-Mills & Porras, 
2002). Brazil allocates revenues from a sales tax to support the integrated management 
of the Rio Ribeira de Iguape Watershed in São Paulo (May, Neto, Denardin, & 
Loureiro, 2002; Rosa, Kandel, & Dimas, 2003); Mexico and Bolivia have created 
similar arrangements for watershed protection financed through a combination of 
private and public funds. 
The case can be made that the need for PES schemes is greatest in developing 
countries (Scherr et al., 2004). However, these countries generally face challenges in 
establishing PES mechanisms due to a low degree of governance and limited 
institutional developments (Kumar, 2005). Other issues plaguing the establishment of 
PES in developing nations are uncertain or inequitable land tenure, lack of experience 
enforcing legal contracts and limited opportunities for non-agricultural investment and 
employment (Ferraro & Kiss, 2002).  
1.1.2 Ecosystem Valuation 
Ecosystem managers, concerned by the loss of global ecosystems in the last 50 
to 60 years, do not have all the information regarding the value of ecosystem services to 
contribute to decisions regarding how to efficiently allocate scarce resource dollars to 
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ecosystem management or conservation (Kumar, 2005; Naidoo & Ricketts, 2006).  
Economic valuation of ecosystems provides a tool for comparing the varied costs and 
benefits connected with ecosystems, yielding an expression of their value in an easily 
understandable metric (Pagiola, von Ritter, & Bishop, 2004). Valuation studies have 
the potential to increase knowledge of the value of ecosystems and the importance of 
protecting ecosystem services to strengthen the case for conservation issues (Edwards 
& Abivardi, 1998; Pagiola et al., 2004). 
Ecosystem valuation can inform the application of economic incentives for 
ecosystem service provision. Accurate economic data, such as the costs and benefits of 
water provision, can contribute to a better understanding of the positions and 
motivations of service providers and beneficiaries. PES design can incorporate this 
data, although numerous PES schemes around the world have failed to do this.  
In a world of finite resources, it is necessary to assess the benefits of protecting 
and enhancing environmental resources against the benefits of forgone alternatives in 
order to understand how to best allocate scarce resources (Bateman & Willis, 1999). 
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is a valuation method for understanding 
people’s preferences for public environmental goods, much like market research is 
employed to understand consumer’s preferences for private, marketed goods (Bateman 
& Willis, 1999; O'Doherty, 1996). CVM involves directly asking people, through a 
survey or questionnaire, how much they would be willing to pay for a hypothetical 
scenario presented in the questionnaire. CVM is dependent upon respondents 
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considering the scenario to be realistic (Whittington, 1996). In this way, CVM can 
contribute valuable information to environmental decision-making. 
While a useful tool in some cases, CVM has its share of shortcomings. Among 
them is the fundamental difference in the way that people value market goods and 
public environmental goods (Diamond & Hausman, 1994; Gowdy, 1997; O'Doherty, 
1996); people’s inexperience with valuing public environmental goods (Bateman & 
Willis, 1999; O'Doherty, 1996); and people’s aversion to placing a dollar value on 
nature (Gowdy, 1997; Vatn & Bromley, 1994). Also, human perception of the value of 
an ecosystem may not reflect the actual biotic contribution (Gowdy, 1997; Vatn & 
Bromley, 1994); and people’s value of an environmental good may not adjust 
according to the scale of the scenario, known as scale bias, (i.e. one whale saved vs. a 
herd of whales saved)(Arrow et al., 2001; Gowdy, 1997). In addition, CVM is 
susceptible to numerous sources of bias and error relating to the payment vehicle, 
strategic behavior, and respondents' lack of awareness on the subject (Bateman, 
Langford, & Rasbah, 1999; Bateman & Willis, 1999; Gowdy, 1997; O'Doherty, 1996).  
Despite its criticisms, CVM has been defended by proponents as a solution to 
“environmental managerialism” because it offers the public a voice in public policy 
decisions, engaging them in a structured dialogue with experts and decision-makers 
(Blore, 1996). Active participation by the respondents is a primary facet of CVM, 
which is a hypothetical direct-valuation technique (O'Doherty, 1996). When some 
proposed policy change will produce an environmental effect, those benefiting or 
suffering from the change are asked directly, via survey or questionnaire, their 
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willingness-to-pay (WTP) to prevent environmental degradation or improve 
environmental quality. Therefore, the process of CVM, rather than simply the results, is 
valuable to decision-makers.  
CVM focuses on forecasted behavior before the environmental change occurs, 
rather than other methods that measure behavior after the change. This can be of use to 
policy makers who will be evaluating the costs and benefits of various alternatives that 
will cause changes in welfare (O'Doherty, 1996). Public attitudes to risk are at the core 
of many environmental issues and risk is built into the framework of CVM (Blore, 
1996). CVM may be one way of exploring the limits to risk acceptance of those that 
ultimately pay and the results are essentially a useful expression of attitudes towards 
public goods or a proposed policy (Diamond & Hausman, 1994). Again, the process of 
CVM is a valuable contribution in and of itself.  
CVM has proved to be an appropriate tool yielding results that contribute to 
understanding public health and public service issues, particularly water services, in 
rural parts of developing nations, with poor, illiterate populations (Casey, Kahn, & 
Rivas, 2005; Mbata, 2006; Onwujekwe, Chima, Shu, Nwagbo, & Okonkwo, 2001; 
Shultz & Soliz, 2007; Whittington, Briscoe, Mu, & Barron, 1990). 
 
1.2 Site Description 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) share a unique set of sustainable 
development challenges due to their small size, topography, and relative isolation 
(Reynolds, DeSisto, Murray, & Kolodinsky, 2007; Tompkins et al., 2005). One 
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significant challenge that SIDS face is the management of water resources—access to 
freshwater resources being of primary concern (Cosgrove & Rijsberman, no date). A 
complex interface between natural factors, a low degree of governance resulting in 
weak water policies, and limited institutional developments, contributes to declining 
quality and quantity of freshwater in many SIDS (Kumar, 2005).  
Freshwater resources are a critical national issue on the Caribbean island of 
Saint Lucia where water scarcity in rural areas during the dry season has reached 
critical capacity (Ministry of Physical Development Environment and Housing, 2004; 
Ministry of Planning Development Environment and Housing, 2001). Population 
growth, internal migration, and infrastructure development are all factors contributing 
to rising water demand on the island. Without groundwater reserves, Saint Lucia is 
completely dependent on rainfall for freshwater supplies. However, due to its steep 
topography and volcanic terrain, rain events cause high levels of run-off, sedimentation, 
erosion, gully formation, and landslides. A lack of natural catchments for water 
collection and storage for treated water compounds the challenge for the government to 
supply freshwater to communities.   
Saint Lucia’s unreliable water supply can be attributed not only to geologic and 
topographic constraints but also to institutional weaknesses in Saint Lucia’s water 
sector. Poor financial performance, operational efficiency, and low capital investment 
are currently overwhelming the water sector (Financial Private Sector and 
Infrastructure Department & Caribbean Country Management Unit, 2001). These 
natural and institutional factors interact with human activities at the watershed-level, 
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further exacerbating environmental quality and water quality for downstream water 
users.  
To help Caribbean SIDS effectively address their environment and management 
challenges the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNEP), along with the Caribbean Environmental Health 
Institute (CEHI) have initiated an Integrated Watershed and Coastal Areas Management 
(IWCAM) program funded through GEF. IWCAM provides a framework for countries 
to better address the environmental challenges that they face through an integrated 
approach to the management of watersheds and coastal areas on the national and 
regional level (UNDP-GEF IWCAM, 2005). The Fond D’or watershed is the site of the 
IWCAM program in Saint Lucia. The primary goal of the Saint Lucian pilot project is 
to improve water quality in the streams and rivers in the Fond D’or watershed, 
contributing to the sustainability of the island and the general health and well-being of 
the population.  
The use of economic incentives for reforestation and/or forest protection as part 
of the IWCAM project is one approach to achieving the protection and potential 
improvement of environmental quality within the Fond D’or watershed. Forested 
watersheds deliver an array of ecosystem services simultaneously while beneficiaries at 
the local, regional, and global scales enjoy these services. For example, water filtration 
(quality), water flow regulation (quantity), micro-climate control, soil stabilization, 
maintenance of aquatic habitats, carbon sequestration, biodiversity and scenic beauty 
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are but a few among many watershed ecosystem services (Daily, 1997; Pagiola, 
Bishop, & Landell-Mills, 2002).  
IWCAM managers in Saint Lucia are interested to understand the importance of 
natural ecosystems within the Fond D’or watershed in terms of their ability to provide 
important ecosystem services that influence the water quality for downstream 
beneficiaries. Ecosystem valuation is a tool that can highlight the importance of these 
natural ecosystems and weigh the benefits of preserving them against the total 
economic, environmental, and social effects of converting the forested slopes of the 
watershed to agricultural activities. By using CVM to understand the motivations of 
service buyers, there is the potential to bolster the case for using economic incentives, 
or a PES mechanism, to promote conservation within the watershed.  
 
1.3 Goals, Objectives, and Methods 
Ecosystem goods and services are those ecosystem processes that contribute to 
human health and well-being. Many of these goods and services are public goods and 
lack a market value. Because of this, the conversion of ecosystem structure into raw 
materials for economic production is rewarded in the marketplace over conservation of 
the ecosystem structure. Rising populations, unsustainable rates of consumption and 
continued neglect have increased the scarcity of ecosystem services around the globe.  
Ecosystem valuation provides a tool to understand and estimate the economic 
value of those goods and services that lack market values. The results of valuation have 
the potential to increase our knowledge of the value of ecosystems and the importance 
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of protecting ecosystem services to strengthen the case for conservation issues. CVM is 
a direct-valuation technique that estimates people's preferences, or demand, for public 
environmental goods. CVM can also be used to estimate people's contributions to 
campaigns to restore or protect these goods.  
As recognition of the state of global ecosystem services has increased, so has 
the use of economic incentives to protect or restore ecosystems on private land for 
public benefit. PES mechanisms directly address the incentive for private landowners to 
convert or degrade natural ecosystems by paying the landowner at least as much as 
he/she would have received from converting the habitat to some other land use. This 
technique is being used in both developing and industrialized nations around the world 
to protect and enhance natural ecosystems. Most widely recognized is Costa Rica's 
national PSA program.  
Ecosystem valuation can inform the application of economic incentives for 
ecosystem service provision. Accurate economic data, such as the costs and benefits of 
water provision, can contribute to a better understanding of the positions and 
motivations of service providers and beneficiaries.  
The goal of this research is to inform the design of a PES mechanism for 
reforestation in the Fond D'or watershed of Saint Lucia. The following chapters 
describe an original application of CVM in the Fond D'or watershed and a framework 
for designing a PES mechanism in the context of Saint Lucia based on a synthesis of 
existing PES literature.  
14 
 
In Chapter 2, I conduct an economic valuation of the household demand for 
reforestation in the Fond D’or watershed using survey data collected using the CVM. 
While researchers typically use CVM to estimate non-use values of ecosystems or 
estimate the damage to natural ecosystems, the household surveys in the Fond D’or 
watershed estimated WTP in order to understand the potential household contribution 
to an economic incentive program for reforestation. This research is the first of its kind 
in the Fond D’or watershed; it will contribute to public policy discussions by providing 
a measure of public demand, as well as information regarding public attitudes and 
support to assess the feasibility of using PES as a tool for the IWCAM project.  
In Chapter 3, I present payments for reforestation as a policy option for 
integrated watershed management in Saint Lucia to improve water quality in the Fond 
D’or watershed. While PES is widely used in South America and the Caribbean, the 
tool has not yet been used in Saint Lucia. Drawing upon lessons from existing PES 
mechanisms around the globe, I present a methodological approach to designing a 
payment mechanism, discussing the elements of the approach in the institutional and 
political context of Saint Lucia. Throughout the paper, I explore some of the 
opportunities and challenges associated with developing a watershed PES scheme and 
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CHAPTER 2: WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY FOR REFORESTATION IN THE 
FOND D’OR WATERSHED, SAINT LUCIA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The benefits provided by natural ecosystems are both widely recognized and 
poorly understood (Daily, 1997). Those benefits come in the form of ecosystem goods 
and services, which are the ecosystem functions that are of use to humans (Daly & 
Farley, 2004). Ecosystem structure provides, most perceptibly, raw materials that are 
converted into market goods. Less concrete are the services delivered through 
ecosystem processes: flood control, waste absorption, nutrient cycling, water, and air 
purification. These services sustain human health and well-being but because they are 
not market goods, conservation of ecosystem structure for the provision of services is 
not rewarded in the marketplace while economic production is. Because ecosystem 
services are delivered spatially as well as temporily, they are difficult to quantify and 
measure. There are trade-offs associated with conserving or enhancing ecosystem 
services: protecting ecosystem structure means forgone alternative values and land 
uses, such as timber extraction or agricultural production (Pagiola, Bishop, & Landell-
Mills, 2002).  
Ecosystem managers, concerned by the loss of global ecosystems in the last 50 
to 60 years, do not have all the information regarding the value of ecosystem services to 
contribute to decisions regarding how to efficiently allocate scarce resource dollars to 
ecosystem management or conservation (Kumar, 2005; Naidoo & Ricketts, 2006).  
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Economic valuation of ecosystems provides a tool for comparing the varied costs and 
benefits connected with ecosystems, yielding an expression of their value in an easily 
understandable metric (Pagiola, von Ritter, & Bishop, 2004). Valuation studies have 
the potential to increase knowledge of the value of ecosystems and the importance of 
protecting ecosystem services to strengthen the case for conservation issues (Edwards 
& Abivardi, 1998; Pagiola et al., 2004). 
Ecosystem valuation can inform the application of economic incentives for 
ecosystem service provision. Payments for ecosystem, or environmental, services (PES) 
are an innovative method of using economic incentives to promote land management 
activities on private land for the public ecosystem services they provide. PES 
mechanisms directly address the incentive to convert or degrade natural ecosystems by 
paying the landowner at least as much as he/she would have received from converting 
the habitat to some other land use. Countries in parts of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as well as North America and Europe, are using this approach for 
environmental protection and improvement.  
PES for hydrological services is a common application of this tool. Almost 30 
percent of the world’s largest cities depend on forested watersheds for their water 
supply (Scherr, White, Khare, Inbar, & Molnar, 2004). As water demand is expected to 
double, even triple, in the next 50 years, especially in developing countries, the 
prospect for increased demand and increased payment for watershed services is vast 
(Scherr et al., 2004). Many countries have already arrived at watershed PES 
arrangements for specific services that are strategic at the local (e.g. downstream 
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agricultural users), regional (e.g. urban water supply) or national (e.g. hydropower 
plant) scale (Robertson & Wunder, 2005).  
While many nations have implemented successful PES schemes, most widely 
known is Costa Rica’s successful pagos por servicios ambientales (PSA or Payments 
for Environmental Services) program. The Costa Rican government implemented this 
nation-wide program in 1996 to compensate landowners for maintaining forests on 
their lands or for reforesting degraded lands, thereby supporting livelihoods while 
promoting conservation. The national PSA program is primarily funded through a tax 
on fuel sales and Global Environment Facility (GEF) grants, whereas several local and 
regional watershed PES schemes are funded through water users’ fees. Similarly, 
Ecuador relies on voluntary payments by water users to supply FONAG, its water fund 
(Echavarria, 2002; Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002); New York City water users’ 
compensate upstream rural agricultural communities for management practices that 
provide clean drinking water (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). Brazil allocates revenues 
from a sales tax to support the integrated management of the Rio Ribeira de Iguape 
Watershed in São Paulo (May, Neto, Denardin, & Loureiro, 2002; Rosa, Kandel, & 
Dimas, 2003); Mexico and Bolivia have created similar arrangements for watershed 
protection financed through a combination of private and public funds. 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) share a unique set of sustainable 
development challenges due to their small size, topography, and relative isolation 
(Reynolds, DeSisto, Murray, & Kolodinsky, 2007; Tompkins et al., 2005). One 
significant challenge that SIDS face is the management of water resources—access to 
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freshwater resources being of primary concern (Cosgrove & Rijsberman, no date). A 
complex interface between natural factors, a low degree of governance resulting in 
weak water policies, and limited institutional developments, contributes to declining 
quality and quantity of freshwater in many SIDS (Kumar, 2005).  
Freshwater resources are a critical national issue on the Caribbean island of 
Saint Lucia where water scarcity in rural areas during the dry season has reached 
critical capacity (Ministry of Physical Development Environment and Housing, 2004; 
Ministry of Planning Development Environment and Housing, 2001). Population 
growth, internal migration, and infrastructure development are all factors contributing 
to rising water demand on the island. Without groundwater reserves, Saint Lucia is 
completely dependent on rainfall for freshwater supplies. However, due to its steep 
topography and volcanic terrain, rain events cause high levels of run-off, sedimentation, 
erosion, gully formation, and landslides. A lack of natural catchments for water 
collection and storage for treated water compounds the challenge for the government to 
supply freshwater to communities.   
Saint Lucia’s unreliable water supply can be attributed not only to geologic and 
topographic constraints but also to institutional weaknesses in Saint Lucia’s water 
sector. Poor financial performance, operational efficiency, and low capital investment 
are currently overwhelming the water sector (Financial Private Sector and 
Infrastructure Department & Caribbean Country Management Unit, 2001). These 
natural and institutional factors interact with human activities at the watershed-level, 
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further exacerbating environmental quality, thereby affecting water quality for 
downstream water users.  
To help Caribbean SIDS effectively address their environment and management 
challenges the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNEP), along with the Caribbean Environmental Health 
Institute (CEHI) have initiated an Integrated Watershed and Coastal Areas Management 
(IWCAM) program funded through GEF. IWCAM provides a framework for countries 
to better address the environmental challenges that they face through an integrated 
approach to the management of watersheds and coastal areas on the national and 
regional level (UNDP-GEF IWCAM, 2005). The Fond D’or watershed is the site of the 
IWCAM program in Saint Lucia. The primary goal of the Saint Lucian pilot project is 
to improve water quality in the streams and rivers in the Fond D’or watershed, 
contributing to the sustainability of the island and the general health and well-being of 
the population.  
The use of economic incentives for reforestation and/or forest protection as part 
of the IWCAM program is one approach to achieving the protection and potential 
improvement of environmental quality within the Fond D’or watershed. Forested 
watersheds deliver an array of ecosystem services simultaneously while beneficiaries at 
the local, regional, and global scales enjoy these services. For example, water filtration 
(quality), water flow regulation (quantity), micro-climate control, soil stabilization, 
maintenance of aquatic habitats, carbon sequestration, biodiversity and scenic beauty 
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are but a few among many watershed ecosystem services (Daily, 1997; Pagiola et al., 
2002).  
IWCAM managers in Saint Lucia are interested to understand the importance of 
natural ecosystems within the Fond D’or watershed in terms of their ability to provide 
important ecosystem services that influence the water quality for downstream 
beneficiaries. Ecosystem valuation is a tool that can highlight the importance of these 
natural ecosystems and weigh the benefits of preserving them against the total 
economic, environmental, and social effects of converting the forested slopes of the 
watershed to agricultural activities. This type of valuation has the potential to bolster 
the case for using economic incentives, or a PES mechanism, to promote conservation 
within the watershed.  
The goal of this research is to conduct an economic valuation of the household 
demand for reforestation in the Fond D’or watershed to contribute to assessing the 
feasibility of implementing a PES scheme. Households are direct consumers of water; 
therefore, residents within the Fond D’or watershed are one of the many groups of 
beneficiaries of watershed ecosystem services. For groups of beneficiaries of various 
ecosystem services delivered by the Fond D’or watershed, willingness-to-pay (WTP) to 
ensure service provision is the principal measure of demand. Supply-side valuation 
studies (opportunity cost) have been done more than WTP studies, meaning that the 
buyers thus know more about the sellers than vice versa (Wunder, 2005). Increasing 
awareness about the buyers among ecosystem service providers could potentially 
improve the prospects for participation in a PES scheme.  
25 
 
This research is the first of its kind in the Fond D’or watershed; it will contribute 
to public policy discussions by providing a measure of public demand, as well as 
information regarding public attitudes and support to assess the feasibility of using PES 
as a tool for the IWCAM project.  
  
2.2 Site Description 
The Fond D’or watershed (Figure 2.1) is located in the Dennery District on the 
eastern side of Saint Lucia, one of the Lesser Antilles islands located in the Caribbean 
Sea. The Fond D’or watershed is one of the largest watersheds in Saint Lucia and is the 
widest watershed at 3.6 miles across (IWCAM, 2008). The Fond D’or River is the main 
body of water within the watershed; the river empties into the Atlantic Ocean at the 
central part of the island’s eastern coastline. The 2001 national census reports that the 
upper watershed contains roughly 36 settlements, consisting of 3,000 households and a 




Figure 2. 1: The Fond D'or watershed, Saint Lucia 
 
The Water and Sewage Company, Inc (WASCO) currently provides drinking 
water and sewage services for which residents pay a monthly fee based on household 
water usage. Although wholly state-owned at this time, WASCO was established in 
1999 as an effort to shift to a private-sector, market-based approach to water provision 
(Geoghegan, Krishnarayan, Pantin, & Bass, 2003). WASCO’s government-owned 
predecessor, the Water and Sewage Authority (WASA), charged low rates and operated 
at a loss. In 2000, shortly after it was established, WASCO instituted rate increases—
the first in over a decade—and now manages to cover its operating expenses as well as 
infrastructure improvements while continuing to repay WASA’s debt. The World Bank 
contributed to the transition from a publicly-owned utility to a privately-operated 
company “under a well-functioning regulatory framework” through a Water Sector 
Reform Technical Assistance project (Sustainable Development Department & 
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Caribbean Country Management Unit, 2007). Despite these efforts, WASCO’s current 
income does not cover the costs of water production and protection and current 
operations continue to be plagued by a legacy of low rates and inadequate infrastructure 
(Geoghegan et al., 2003).  
The current state of the water sector is detrimental not only to the health and 
welfare of Saint Lucia’s citizens, but also to the island’s economic development, which 
is strongly linked to the island's competive edge as a tourism destination. Agribusiness, 
formerly Saint Lucia’s primary component of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has 
declined from 15% in 1990 to 5% in 2003, and tourism subsequently assumed the role 
as principal contributor to the island’s economy (Sustainable Development Department 
& Caribbean Country Management Unit, 2007). The water and sanitation sector has 
emerged as a key limiting factor in realizing the island’s tourism development 
potential; access to basic services by developers and hoteliers is hindering their interest 
in investing in the island. 
Efforts to reform the water sector are currently underway; one proposed water 
policy advocates that water users’ fees cover all costs of production, storage, treatment, 
and delivery, including the costs associated with “protecting forests, watersheds and 
other ecosystems required to regulate and maintain water quality” (Geoghegan et al., 
2003). Additionally, the Water Supply Infrastructure Improvement project, a short-term 
investment program funded by the World Bank, is currently carrying out “critical 
works” to alleviate water shortages in the north of the country (Sustainable 
Development Department & Caribbean Country Management Unit, 2007). This project 
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is expected to improve the water supply infrastructure in the north of the island, thereby 
facilitating new developments in the tourism industry and improving the quality of life 
of roughly 100,000 people. Residential customers also hope to benefit because of this 
project by increasing coverage to households currently without water services.  
Despite the targeted efforts to make over Saint Lucia’s struggling institutions and 
water infrastructure, water quality issues related to upstream land use of the ecosystems 
that provide water regulation services have not been addressed. Water quality in the 
Fond D’or watershed, for instance, is a serious concern and is largely attributed to 
upstream human activities (Geoghegan et al., 2003). Conversion of steep forested land 
for agriculture and grazing causes in influx of sediment in the water, while the use of 
agrochemicals for banana production pollutes the water. The use of sub-standard septic 
systems, pit latrines, and the river for bathing and washing along with unregulated 
development along riverbanks contributes to a decline in water quality. While Saint 
Lucia has a low prevalence of waterborne diseases overall (safewateronline.com, 
2008), recent testing of surface water in the watershed reveals high fecal coliform 
counts (IWCAM, 2008).  
 
2.3 Methods 
PES schemes are fundamentally an exchange between the beneficiaries of 
ecosystem service(s) and the providers of the service(s) to ensure continued service 
provision. Therefore, PES design requires that we identify the providers and 
beneficiaries of an ecosystem service, or bundle of services, and consider them in a 
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variety of potential arrangements. Accurate economic data, such as the costs and 
benefits of water provision, can contribute to a better understanding of the positions and 
motivations of service providers and beneficiaries. PES design can incorporate this 
data, although numerous PES schemes around the world have failed to do this.  
University of Vermont undergraduate students enrolled in a service-learning 
course titled Sustainable Development in Island Economies: Saint Lucia developed a 
survey to understand household WTP for reforestation with water quality improvement 
being one potential benefit. The goal of the survey was to elicit attitudes towards 
reforestation and to obtain a dollar estimate of WTP for a reforestation program using 
the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM); the resulting metric will contribute to 
assessing the household contribution to financing of a PES scheme in the Fond D’or 
watershed.  
1.3.1 Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) 
In a world of finite resources, it is necessary to assess the benefits of protecting 
and enhancing environmental resources against the benefits of forgone alternatives in 
order to understand how to best allocate scarce resources (Bateman & Willis, 1999). 
CVM is a method for understanding people’s preferences for public environmental 
goods, much like market research is employed to understand consumer’s preferences 
for private, marketed goods (Bateman & Willis, 1999; O'Doherty, 1996). In this way, 
CVM can contribute valuable information to environmental decision-making. CVM 
involves directly asking people, through a survey or questionnaire, how much they 
would be willing to pay for a hypothetical scenario presented in the questionnaire. 
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CVM is dependent upon respondents considering the scenario to be realistic 
(Whittington, 1996). 
While a useful tool in some cases, CVM has its share of shortcomings. Among 
them is the fundamental difference in the way that people value market goods and 
public environmental goods (Diamond & Hausman, 1994; Gowdy, 1997; O'Doherty, 
1996); people’s inexperience with valuing public environmental goods (Bateman & 
Willis, 1999; O'Doherty, 1996); and people’s aversion to placing a dollar value on 
nature (Gowdy, 1997; Vatn & Bromley, 1994). Also, human perception of the value of 
an ecosystem may not reflect the actual biotic contribution (Gowdy, 1997; Vatn & 
Bromley, 1994); and people’s value of an environmental good may not adjust 
according to the scale of the scenario, known as scale bias, (i.e. one whale saved vs. a 
herd of whales saved)(Arrow et al., 2001; Gowdy, 1997). In addition, CVM is 
susceptible to numerous sources of bias and error relating to the payment vehicle, 
strategic behavior, and lack of awareness on the subject (Bateman, Langford, & 
Rasbah, 1999; Bateman & Willis, 1999; Gowdy, 1997; O'Doherty, 1996).  
Despite its criticisms, CVM has been defended by proponents as a solution to 
“environmental managerialism” because it offers the public a voice in public policy 
decisions, engaging them in a structured dialogue with experts and decision-makers 
(Blore, 1996). Active participation by the respondents is a primary facet of CVM, 
which is a hypothetical direct-valuation technique (O'Doherty, 1996). When some 
proposed policy change will produce an environmental effect, those benefiting or 
suffering from the change are asked directly, via survey or questionnaire, their WTP to 
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prevent environmental degradation or improve environmental quality. Therefore, the 
process of CVM, rather than simply the results, is valuable to decision-makers.  
CVM focuses on forecasted behavior before the environmental change occurs, 
rather than other methods that measure behavior after the change. This can be of use to 
policy makers who will be evaluating the costs and benefits of various alternatives that 
will cause changes in welfare (O'Doherty, 1996). Public attitudes to risk are at the core 
of many environmental issues and risk is built into the framework of CVM (Blore, 
1996). CVM may be one way of exploring the limits to risk acceptance of those that 
ultimately pay and the results are essentially a useful expression of attitudes towards 
public goods or a proposed policy (Diamond & Hausman, 1994). Again, the process of 
CVM is a valuable contribution in and of itself.  
While researchers typically use CVM to estimate non-use values of ecosystems 
or estimate the damage to natural ecosystems, the household surveys in the Fond D’or 
watershed estimated WTP in order to understand the potential household contribution 
to an economic incentive program for reforestation. Asking people to contribute to 
program development is not estimating non-use values (Blore, 1996). In this case, we 
did not use CMV to estimate the monetary value of water quality or the upland 
ecosystem structure that provides the services that affect water quality. Therefore, this 
CVM application was not susceptible to the myriad of aforementioned criticisms of the 
typical use of CVM.  
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2.4 Survey Methods and Descriptive Findings 
We developed the household surveys utilizing CVM in the fall of 2007 at the 
University of Vermont. The surveys underwent several rounds of revisions after careful 
review by survey experts at UVM as well as by IWCAM project partners in Saint 
Lucia.  
We paired UVM students from the service-learning course with volunteers from 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of Saint Lucia and provided 
training in proper survey administration technique. The survey teams delivered the 
surveys to five community groups in the Fond D’or watershed (Figure 2.1, Table 2.1) 
in January 2008. Surveys lasted an average of 10 to 15 minutes and included both 
closed-form and open-ended questions related to their domestic water source(s) and 
uses, water availability and WTP an additional amount on their monthly water bill to 
support reforestation efforts in the watershed. In addition, we asked respondents about 
their satisfaction with the quality and quantity of the drinking water they received, as 
well as their opinions on the status of drinking water in the valley, and if the cost of 
their water service was fair for the quality and quantity of water they received. Survey 




















Table 2.1: Communities by group in the Fond D'or watershed 
Group  Communities N 
1  La Caye, Lumiere, LaPelle 31 
2  AuxLyon, Gadette, LaRessources, Despinoz 76 
3  Deniere Riviere, Belmont 70 
4  RichFond, Grande Ravine 41 
5  Grande Riviere, Mornpanache, Debonaire, Thomazo 76 
 
We collected 294 surveys for a 95% confidence level. Sixty-seven percent of 
respondents were female, with a mean age of 44 years. Because we conducted the 
surveys during the workweek between the hours of 10:00 a.m and 3:00 p.m, the 
majority of the people encountered during that period were women working in the 
home, which explains the high percentage of female respondents. We also encountered 
Figure 2 2: Location of community groups in the Fond D'or watershed 
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a high number of retirees and elderly due to the time of day in which survey delivery 
occured.  
The mean family size was 4; this number is higher than the mean family size of 
3 recorded in the most recent national census (St. Lucia Government Statistics 
Department, 2001). The majority of survey respondents reported a monthly income of 
less than EC $1000 ($375 US) which is consistent with the 2001 Saint Lucian national 
average of EC $927 per month. Half of the respondents' households contain at least one 
person who had completed a secondary education; 19% of households contain at least 
one person who had some college education but no degree. Figure 2.3 displays the 
highest education level attained by a member of a household by community group. 
Fifty-eight percent of households listed three or more domestic uses of water (i.e. 
shower, flush toilet, washing machine, and/or garden). Thirty-two percent of 






Figure 2. 3: Household education levels by community group 
Water Sources and Uses 
In order to obtain a list of household water sources, we asked respondents whether 
they use one or more of the following water supplies in their home: piped water from 
WASCO, rainwater collected in storage tanks, water obtained from a river, creek, or 
stream, bottled water, or another source. Other sources of water that we recorded were 
public water taps (not available in every community) and trucks that deliver water from 
public taps, springs, or the river. Several respondents mentioned that they acquire water 
from a neighbor or family member; we were unable to determine the reason for this, 
however, we assume that those households are not connected to WASCO services. 
We asked respondents to indicate their main water sources for the following uses: 
cooking, cleaning, bathing, drinking, laundry, garden (if applicable), or other household 
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water uses. Respondents named WASCO as the main water supply for each of the 
activities listed. However, due to the infrequent supply of piped WASCO water, we 
found that respondents generally rely on a combination of sources to meet their water 
needs. For cooking, cleaning, bathing, and laundry the proportion of respondents using 
solely WASCO water is roughly 60%; those using a combination of WASCO and 
collected rainwater is 30%; the remaining 10% of respondents use some other 
combination of rainwater, springwater, or purchase bottled water. Households with 
kitchen gardens rely mainly on natural precipitation; however, 75% of respondents 
indicate that they use WASCO water on their gardens occasionally. Only 21% of 
residents rely solely on WASCO water for their drinking water, while 30% purchase 
bottle water in addition to WASCO water; 14% use a combination of WASCO water 
and collected rainwater. Fourteen percent of respondents drink only bottled water and 
23% use a combination of rainwater, springwater, or purchase bottled water. Two 
percent of respondents indicated that they boil and/or filter tap water prior to 
consumption. 
Water Quality 
When we asked their opinion on whether there is a problem with drinking water 
in the valley, the overwhelming majority of respondents (92%) stated that there is a 
problem. When we asked them to identify the cause of the problem, 28% remarked on 
the generally poor quality of the water; 25% attributed the problem to management 
(WASCO or the government); 19% attributed the problem to faulty water infrastructure 
such as pipes or water tanks; respondents also mentioned weather and seasonal 
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shortages as possible causes. When we asked who should be responsible for addressing 
problems with drinking water in the valley, the majority (85%) responded that the 
government and/or WASCO should be responsible for addressing the problem.  
We asked respondents to rate their satisfication with the quality of the water they 
receive from WASCO and 22% responded that they are either highly satisfied or 
satisfied. Thirty-five percent reported that the quality of water they receive is suitable 
for household needs and 13% believe that the cost of WASCO service is fair for the 
quality that they receive. We asked respondents to describe the quality of the water 
from the tap; common responses were “dirty,” “brown” in color, “silty,” or having 
“sediment” due to a lack of a “filtration system.” Many also reported that the water is 
particularly dirty during and after rain events. Descriptions of a “bad taste,” “funny 
smell,” worms, and algae in the water were common. Equally common were reports of 
a bitter taste of food due to over-chlorination. One respondent said that the “purity of 
the water is doubtful” because he/she is aware of the environmental conditions near the 
water intake. Another respondent went as far as to say, “[the water] is not fit for 
consumption.”  
Water Quantity 
When asked to rate their satisfication with the quantity of the water they receive 
from WASCO, 26% of respondents indicated that they are highly satisfied or satisfied. 
When asked whether the amount of water they receive is sufficient for their household 
needs, 36% responded “yes” and 33% believe that the cost of WASCO service is fair 
for the water quantity they receive.  
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Respondent satisfaction levels indicate that water quantity is less of a problem 
than water quality in some communities. While we were unable to conclude the cause 
of this disparity, a reasonable assumption is that the placement of each community in 
the watershed (Figure 2.2) and the condition of the water infrastructure in a particular 
community each plays a role in varying water quantity. Some communities, or groups 
of dwellings, are located on slopes in the upper watershed, whereas others are 
positioned on the flats of the mid-to-lower watershed. Several respondents mentioned 
that they do not have a problem with quantity because they live in a flat area where the 
water pipes converge. Some respondents in the upper watershed mentioned that even 
though they live within sight of the WASCO water tank, they do not receive water 
frequently.  
To support our assumption that the condition of water infrastructure varies by 
community, one community reported having water meters recently installed and the 
community members had observed the meter needles spinning sporadically. Residents 
of this community group reported that their water charges increased following the 
installation of the meters while their usage had not altered. Although anecdotal, this 
suggests that the condition of the water infrastructure and WASCO’s management 
presence may vary in each community. 
When we asked respondents to describe the quantity of water, we frequently 
heard comments on the timing of water availability, that it is “not reliable”, “not 
regular”, that it comes for “five minutes and is gone” or is only available “late at night” 
between the hours of “11 p.m. and 5 a.m.” or “9 p.m. and 5 a.m.” Descriptions of water 
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availability varied; some respondents stated that they did not receive water for days’ at 
a time; others reported going weeks without water in the tap. Respondents commented 
that the amount of water typically received is “not enough to do house chores” and that 
the stream of water coming from the tap is only a “trickle” so it takes “half an hour to 
fill a bucket.” Other respondents said that there is not enough water to use their sinks 
and/or flush toilets, or to have a “good shower.”  
When asked if there are certain times of year when they do not have enough 
water, 89% of respondents said “yes.” Because Saint Lucia relies solely on rainfall for 
freshwater supplies, we expected water shortages occur primarily during the dry 
season. However, 41% reported shortages during the rainy season and 32% reported 
shortages during the dry season. Based on descriptions of water quality collected, it is 
common knowledge in the communities that WASCO shuts off the water pipes during 
monsoon season to prevent mud from running through the pipes. Due to a lack of water 
during the dry season and lack of water service during the rainy season, 27% of 
respondents reported shortages year-round. Table 2.2 summarizes respondents’ 
opinions on water quality, quantity, and seasonal shortages. 
 





















Willingness-to-pay for reforestation 
We presented the WTP question to respondents in a double-dichotomous 
question format. The scenario read to respondents went:  
“Healthy forests provide many public benefits; forests provide consistent water 
supply, flood and drought control and wildlife habitat. A program is being 
considered for forest re-growth in the Fond D’or watershed. In this program, 
several acres of land would be [taken out of agriculture production and] reforested 
upstream to protect a clean source of water for future use. I would like to remind 
you that this program does not currently exist; we are gathering this information 
to be used in developing programs for water service improvement." 
 
After reading the scenario, we asked respondents “Would you be willing to pay 
an additional amount on your monthly water bill to support a program that reforests 
land upstream to protect a water source?” to which they answered “yes” or “no”. If a 
respondent answered “yes”, we took them through a series of bids levels that increased 
by an amount of EC $1.50, which is 10% of the EC $15 ($5.72 US) reported to be 
WASCO's minimum monthly charge (IWCAM, 2008). The bid levels were EC $1.50, 
3.00, 4.50, 6.00, 7.50, 9.00, 10.50, 12.00, 13.50, and 15.00. Respondents answered 
“yes” or “no” to each bid level; their maximum WTP was taken to be the amount to 
which they answered “no.” If a respondent said they were willing to pay the highest bid 
level of EC $15, we asked if they would be WTP more than $15.00 EC. If they 
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responded “yes,” we elicited an exact value of maximum WTP through an open-ended 
question.  
 While the majority of respondents believe that WASCO or the government 
should be responsible for addressing water problems in the valley, 74% of respondents 
indicated that they are willing to pay an extra amount on their monthly water bill to 
support a watershed reforestation program (Figure 2.4). We calculated the mean WTP 
per household for the hypothetical reforestation scenario to be EC $4.881 per month 
($1.84 US). Figure 2.5 summarizes respondents’ WTP for the hypothetical reforestation 
program presented to them in the survey. In addition to WTP, 94% of respondents think 
that farmers should be compensated for participating in a program that requires them to 
take land out of production for reforestation.  
Seventy-one percent of respondents reported that they pay their monthly water 
bill to WASCO. Of the 29% that do not currently pay their water bill, many explained 
in responses to follow-up questions that they ceased paying their bill because they felt 
they should not pay for something that they do not receive. Respondents also 
commented that water fees continue to rise while the number of days a week or month 
that they receive water continues to fall. While we had previously been told that EC 
$15 is the minimum monthly water charge, the survey revealed that water charges 
range broadly from EC $7 to EC $350 per month with a mean of EC $32.52 ($12.46 
US). 
                                               




Figure 2. 4: Percent of respondents willing to pay extra to support a reforestation program 
 
 




2.5 Analysis of Survey Data 
I performed statistical analyses to understand more fully the willingness of 
residents of the Fond D’or watershed to pay for reforestation of the watershed with 
improved water quality being one of many potential environmental benefits, based on 
their economic, demographic, and opinion/attitudinal profile. I believe that the survey 
responses provide an indication of residents’ support for environmental programs that 
seek to improve the condition of the watershed, particularly in terms of its ability to 
provide a consistent flow of clean water. Such information might be of value to the 
IWCAM program as well as to Saint Lucian policy makers when considering a course 
of action to address pressing environmental and social issues. The survey responses 
also provide a monetary estimate of household WTP for reforestation that can be 
considered a potential financing source for environmental improvement programs in the 
Fond D’or watershed. 
 
2.6 Results 
I performed bivariate analyses on household water sources, water uses, and 
satisfaction with current water services. The bivariate analysis of the binary WTP 
variable yielded only two significant variables: water suitable for household needs 
(p=.028, χ2=4.842) and whether a respondent resides in community group 3 (p=.026, 
χ2=4.958). These results suggest that a respondent’s WTP is a factor of their opinions 
regarding the suitability of the water they receive from WASCO and residence specific 
to community group 3. While literature suggests that WTP is a product of demographic 
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characteristics including age, gender, and socioeconomic factors—higher education and 
income levels will lead to increased WTP—we cannot confidently assert that education 
(p=.264, χ2=3.976) or income (p=.199, χ2=15.834) are factors influencing WTP among 
the residents of the Fond D’or watershed.  
Bivariate analyses of the binary community group variables reveal that 
residence in a particular community group significantly influences several 
attitudinal/opinion variables. Residents in community group 1 are more satisfied with 
their water quality than other community groups (p=.006, χ2=7.426), while residents in 
community group 2 (p=.010, χ2=6.714) and community group 3 (p=.001, χ2=10.586) 
are more satisfied with their water quantity than other community groups. More 
residents in community group 1 believe that the water is suitable for their household 
needs (p=.002, χ2=9.241), while more residents in community group 2 (p=.004, 
χ2=8.258) believe that the water is not suitable for their needs. Lastly, a higher 
proportion of residents in community group 3 pay their monthly water bill (p=.000, 
χ2=15.400) than do residents of other community groups, while a significantly smaller 
proportion (54%) of residents in community group 5 pay their bill (p=.001, χ2=10.770). 
For the 47 respondents willing-to-pay the highest bid amount of EC $15 ($5.68 
US), or more than EC $15, residence in community group 3 was the prominent factor 
(p=.039, χ2=4.273). A higher proportion of those 47 respondents reside in community 
group 3 than in other community groups. For the respondents residing within 
community group 3, significant characteristics are education (p=.000, χ2=17.850), 
satisfaction with water quantity (p=.001, χ2=10.586), and whether or not they pay their 
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WASCO water bill (p=.000, χ2=15.400). While the overall education level of residents 
in community group 3 is consistent with that of other community groups (Figure 2.2), a 
higher number of residents in community group 3 reported having an education “other” 
than a primary, secondary, or tertiary education. Twelve percent of respondents in 
community group 3 had “other” education compared with less than 2% in the other four 
community groups. Ninety percent of residents in community group 3 pay their 
monthly water bill compared to 50% in community group 1, 71% in community group 
2, 75% in community group 4, and 54% in community group 5 (p=.001, χ2=10.770). 
These results suggest that a more education and regular payment of the water bill by the 
residents of community group 3 may play a factor in their higher WTP.  
 
2.7 Discussion and Limitations 
The analysis of survey data presented here suggests that WTP by residents in 
the Fond D’or watershed is a factor of their attitudes and opinions about current water 
quality and quantity rather than demographic variables such as ability-to-pay. Water 
quality and quantity appear to vary by location in the watershed with water 
infrastructure and WASCO management presence. Therefore, residence in a particular 
community group likely influences opinions on water quality and quantity. 
Residents of the communities of group 3 are willing-to-pay the highest bid level 
of EC $15 or higher, more than residents from other community groups. While 
education was not determined to be an influential factor of overall WTP, education is a 
significant characteristic of community group 3: residents of community group 3 have a 
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larger proportion of non-traditional education than other community groups. While I 
cannot conclusively attribute the higher level of WTP to the higher rate of non-
traditional education, it is certainly a defining characteristic of the community group. A 
failure in the survey instrument's ability to precisely capture a respondent's WTP 
beyond the highest bid level could also explain the high proportion of residents in 
community group 3 that was willing-to-pay EC $15 or more. The open-ended question 
after the last bid levels left room for error.  
I was unable to perform further statistical analysis due an incomplete data set. 
The data was collected as part of a project for an undergraduate-level service-learning 
course and while students were given training in proper survey administration 
techniques, for many it was their first experience in a foreign country or working in the 
field in a foreign country. Inconsistencies in data collection resulted in large amounts of 
missing data. While the process of service learning was the primary goal of the course, 
the data collected as a result contains valuable information. This research, being 
exploratory in nature, provides insight into the current condition of drinking water in 
the Fond D’or watershed and residents’ attitudes towards potential environmental 
improvement programs. Anecdotal evidence from the surveys reveals that the condition 
of drinking water is a highly controversial issue in the communities and, overall, 
residents have an unfavorable view of WASCO. Despite negative feelings towards 
WASCO and the general belief that WASCO or the government should be responsible 
for addressing the current water situation, the majority of respondents are willing-to-
pay to support reforestation programs. When interpreting the WTP estimate, it is 
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important to remember that self-reported WTP often differs from revealed, or actual, 
WTP (Verhoef & Franses, 2002). By responding that they are WTP, respondents are 
not committing to an actual payment. Due to the inability of many respondents to 
detach the hypothetical reforestation scenario from the need for water infrastructure 
improvement, the mean WTP calculated is not an exact estimate for reforestation 
efforts. Additionally, as it is unclear whether there is a penalty for residents who do not 
pay their water bill, it is not possible to predict whether an increase in water users’ fees 
will cause more people to cease paying their bill.  
Studies have repeatedly revealed that stated WTP significantly exceeds revealed 
WTP (Goldar & Misra, 2001; Kealy, Dovidio, & Rockel, 1988; Loomis, Brown, 
Lucero, & Peterson, 1996; Neill, Cummings, Ganderton, Harrison, & McGuckin, 1994; 
Reynolds, 2007). While the disparity between stated WTP and revealed WTP varies 
depending on the commodity being valued and the study design, 50% is a common 
over-estimate. Adjusting for this differential, the potential annual contribution from an 
increase in water users’ fees is approximately EC $1,000,000 or $400,000 US. 
To compare this figure to one of the costs of water treatment in Saint Lucia, a 
previous UVM study conducted in the Talvan watershed of Saint Lucia in 2007 
estimated that the annual cost of using PAX-18, a chemical that increases the settling 
rate of sediment, plus labor costs, is $27,891 US (adjusted from 2006 USD) or EC 
$73,074 (Alkire, Kerchner, Sadoff, & Skaskiw, 2007). Sedimentation has other costs as 
well; the cleaning of silt-laden screens at water treatment facilities results in the loss of 
approximately 120,000 gallons of treated water per week (Alkire et al., 2007). If 
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treatment costs are similar in the Fond D'or watershed, these figures demonstrates that 
improved upstream land management practices in conjunction with reforestation could 
significantly reduce sedimention and downstream wastewater treatment costs of using 
PAX-18, as well as a decrease in the loss of treated water. Reduced siltation in the 
pipes would also potentially decrease the number of days in the rainy season in which 
water treatment facilities shut down, positively impacting water availability for 
residents. The current cost of wastewater treatment is 7% of the potential annual 
contribution from an increase in water users’ fees; this shows that a minimal investment 
of these funds would see a large decrease in the costs of wastewater treatment and 
treated water losses.  
2.8.1 Sources of Error 
In addition to limitations associated with self-reported WTP, the survey was 
susceptible to various sources of error including information-based error, respondent-
based error, and researcher-based error. Information-based error pertains to how the 
information was provided by the administrator and how it was received by the 
respondent and the potential for error to occur during the exchange (O'Doherty, 1996). 
How the information was provided and how it was received determines if the answers 
given reflect what the researcher seeks and, ultimately, establishes the accuracy of the 
data. The amount of information provided in the hypothetical WTP scenario was 
paramount to the scenario being believable, but also presented a risk in that lengthy 
descriptions tend to result in respondent tedium and faulty responses (Bateman & 
Willis, 1999; O'Doherty, 1996).  
49 
 
What type of information provided—whether “positive” or “negative” 
information (this is entirely subjective) — determines how the information is received 
and then used in the valuation process. We provided “positive” slanting information 
about forest ecosystem services in the hypothetical scenario because the target 
population’s level of knowledge about ecosystems and the services they provide was 
unknown. In this case, we used the CVM scenario as an educational tool to increase 
awareness about ecosystem services in addition to being a tool to elicit WTP. In an 
effort to be concise, we withheld information about economic impacts of removing 
agricultural activities from the watershed and necessary alterations to current water 
infrastructure.  
Another possible source of respondent-based error is strategic behavior. 
Strategic behavior depends on the perceived payment obligation and probability of 
good provision (O'Doherty, 1996). People may over- or underestimate in hopes of 
securing good provision, or enjoying continued provision, at a low price. The strategic 
underestimation of WTP in the hopes of gaining a public-funded benefit for which the 
respondent truly has a higher WTP than stated is known as ‘free-riding’(Bateman et al., 
1999). The majority of respondent ‘free-riders’ will give a small undervaluation while a 
few anti-free-riders will give large overvaluations (O'Doherty, 1996). It is possible to 
counteract strategic behavior by telling the respondent that the sample size is smaller 
than it really is so that the respondent feels that his/her response will have a great effect 
and also by telling the respondent that the provision of the good is dependent on 
revealed WTP (O'Doherty, 1996). We do not perceive strategic behavior to be a threat 
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to the validity of the survey findings presented here. The payment vehicle utilized in 
hypothetical scenario was that of an additional fee tacked on to water users’ fees. Since 
the collection of water fees currently occurs and the majority of the respondents pay 
their water bill, the opportunity to free ride was limited.  
Another source of respondent-based error arises from inexperience with valuing 
public goods. Household survey respondents oftentimes seemed confused by the 
increasing dollar bid amounts in the second level of the double-dichotomous WTP 
questions. It appears that respondents felt that by indicating that they were willing to 
pay some amount, they had “agreed” to one amount and the agreement was reneged 
when they were asked to pay another, higher amount. To address this, we told 
respondents prior to beginning the bidding process that they would be presented with a 
series of dollar amounts and they were to indicate when the amount was beyond their 
means or inclination to pay. Some respondents were not WTP because they felt like the 
government should provide water services or that they already pay a fee to WASCO, so 
they should not have to pay any additional amount.   
It is also possible that respondents’ preferences were simply a reaction to the 
foreign survey administrators. Respondents are able to sense what the survey 
administrator “wants” and may say that they are willing-to-pay more for a good than 
they really are (Bateman & Willis, 1999). We introduced the survey as a means to 
gather information about water; the fact that foreign researchers were conducting the 
surveys could have been interpreted as outside assistance to an assumed problem. If 
respondents thought that by participating in the survey their problems might be 
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addressed, they might be more likely to tell the administrator what they think they want 
to hear. Appropriate control for this in face-to-face interactions is to offer “irrelevant” 
information rather than zero information (Bateman & Willis, 1999). Dichotomous 
questions are also better than open-ended questions to lessen this effect (O'Doherty, 
1996). These effects on the household survey were likely minimized because the survey 
consisted mostly of dichotomous questions and provided relatively neutral information. 
Additionally, UVM student researchers were accompanied in the field by local Saint 
Lucian residents who provided important cultural and language services; the presence 
of Saint Lucian assistants may have also mitigated the effects of the foreign researchers 
on survey responses. 
Scale bias was not a concern for this application of CVM. We did not ask 
respondents to differentiate their WTP for different levels of water purity or forest 
protection. The scenario was vague in regards to the amount of forest necessary to 
maintain or improve water quality and as a result, we did not ask respondents to value 1 
hectare of forest versus 100 hectares; they were simply asked their WTP to contribute 
to an overall reforestation program.  
Lastly, because many of the respondents view WASCO with skepticism and 
mistrust, the payment vehicle proposed in the hypothetical scenario may have affected 
their WTP. The scenario postured that the hypothetical reforestation program would be 
funded by affixing an additional amount on the monthly water utility bill. Survey 
administrators stressed that that an additional fee would not go to WASCO, but rather 
to the farmers to fund reforestation efforts near water sources. Despite this clarification, 
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it may have been difficult for respondents to agree to such a proposition, especially if 
they do not currently pay their water bill or have strong opinions regarding WASCO 
and its operations. This demonstrates that respondents do not value a change in 
environmental service provision in isolation of the wider policy context; the true 
measure of value includes attitudes towards the payment vehicle as part of the wider 
policy context (O'Doherty, 1996). 
2.8.2 CVM and PES 
One of the goals of the CVM survey in the Fond D’or watershed was to 
estimate WTP in order to conduct a valuation of the demand for reforestation with the 
goal of improved water quality. These findings illustrate household demand for 
environmental improvements that may increase water quality: 74% of households are 
willing-to-pay to receive the potential benefits of reforestation. In addition, valuation 
can be used to identify potential financing sources for conservation interventions, to 
secure sufficient funds at any given time as well as to make financing self-sustaining 
into the future. This research estimates the potential PES financing source offered by 
household contributions at EC $1,000,000 or $400,000 US annually.  
Household WTP, or household demand, is one piece of information needed to 
understand how to apply economic incentives properly. However, finding the necessary 
WTP within less affluent communities oftentimes poses a significant challenge; the 
ability of poor downstream users to pay for upstream environmental service protection 
is usually low (Robertson & Wunder, 2005). Supply-side valuation is another piece 
critical to PES, perhaps even more so than demand-side valuation (Pagiola et al., 2004). 
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For farmers or landowners, the foregone benefits of alternative land uses—opportunity 
costs—estimate the supply side of providing ecosystem services, particularly water 
filtration services, by protecting existing forests or targeting areas for reforestation. 
Agricultural land use in the Fond D’or watershed consists mostly of banana and other 
fruit tree plantations and root crops like yam and dasheen. According to recent national 
data compiled by the Saint Lucia Ministry of Agriculture, the annual opportunity cost 
per acre of yams and dasheen is EC $32,418 ($12,142 US). Conducting supply-side and 
demand-side valuation will help set an appropriate payment level so that the payment 
exceeds the benefit from the next best alternative land use (or behavior won’t change) 
and less than the value to downstream users (or they won’t pay). 
2.8.3 CVM as an Educational Tool 
Diamond (1994) indicates that people may not be aware of their preferences for 
public environmental goods prior to being queried. Thus, respondents will actually 
form preferences during the valuation process. In this way CVM is an important 
educational tool, helping people define and understand their attitudes and preferences 
towards the environment (Vatn & Bromley, 1994). We selected the information 
provided in the CVM scenario of the household survey as a tool to communicate the 
benefits provided by natural ecosystems. This effort towards public education is 




2.8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The results of the contingent valuation survey in the Fond D’or watershed 
reveal a high demand (WTP) for environmental improvements at the household level. 
Seventy-four percent of residents in the Fond D’or watershed are willing-to-pay for 
these improvements; an average WTP of EC $4.88 per household per month was 
calculated, amounting to EC $1,000,000 or $400,000 US annually. Household WTP 
represents one possible funding source for financing a PES mechanism in the 
watershed. While valuation helps to build a case for a payment mechanism, final prices 
agreed upon will reflect the costs and benefits to the stakeholders.  
There does not appear to be a major problem with scale bias, hypothetical bias, or 
strategic behavior with this application of CVM. However, it is not possible to predict 
whether individuals, if asked, would pay the amount they indicated in the survey. Since 
most of the residents pay their monthly water bill to WASCO and indicate support for 
the hypothetical increase in users’ fees, it seems that if WASCO were to institute a flat 
rate increase for all water users for environmental improvement efforts, there would 
likely be public support. This is important for public policy makers and the managers of 
the IWCAM project as they evaluate the costs and benefits of various alternatives that 
will affect residents in the watershed. However, due to the varying condition of water 
infrastructure within the communities, infrastructure improvement is a necessary part of 
such a program and concerted efforts on behalf of WASCO may improve their image 
and reputation within the communities, which may ultimately increase support for 
reforestation of the watershed. 
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To better assess the feasibility of a PES scheme in the Fond D’or watershed, I 
recommend future research to quantify the biophysical nature of ecosystem services in 
the watershed. For water quality, this means understanding the source(s), nature, and 
flow of the service as well as the land use thought to deliver the desired services. Next, 
I recommend that further valuation studies be conducted to understand the costs of 
service provision. This will entail inquiring into landowners, or service providers’, 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) compensation and attitudes towards participation in a 
program, as well as the opportunity costs of taking land out of production for 
reforestation. Calculating the opportunity costs of participation and WTA is a critical 
piece to assessing the feasibility of a PES mechanism. We estimated the opportunity 
cost for agricultural land in root crops, but further estimation of opportunity costs of 
other agricultural land uses is needed. While household WTP represents one potential 
financing mechanism for a PES scheme, other potential mechanisms should also be 
explored. This includes other private payment mechanisms through tourism, 
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CHAPTER 3: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO CONSTRUCTING 
PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN THE FOND D’OR 
WATERSHED, SAINT LUCIA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A key conclusion of the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) is that global 
ecosystems—forests, coral reefs, wetlands, and other ecosystems—have been severely 
degraded and, without intervention, will further deteriorate. This conclusion has serious 
implications to humans who benefit from ecosystem goods and services, which are the 
ecosystem functions that are of importance to our well-being and survival (Daly & 
Farley, 2004). Most of us recognize that ecosystems provide raw materials that fuel 
economic production of the goods that we purchase in the marketplace. Less 
recognizable are the services delivered through ecosystem processes such as flood 
control, waste absorption, nutrient cycling, water, and air purification, etc. Many of 
these services are public goods and, therefore, lie outside the realm of the economic 
marketplace. This means that markets generally reward resource extraction for 
economic production while failing to reward the conservation of ecosystem structure 
for the provision of public ecosystem services. Rising populations, unsustainable rates 
of consumption, and continued neglect have increased the scarcity of ecosystem 
services around the globe.  
In response to these market failures, governments often step in on behalf of the 
public to provide ecosystem services through various policy approaches. These policy 
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approaches can be condensed into the “5 P’s”: prescription, penalties, persuasion, 
property rights, and payment (Salzman, 2005). While each policy approach has an 
application for specific services, and socio-political contexts, payment is a promising 
option for developing nations where prescription via regulatory command-and-control 
measures have failed, in part, because the governments lack the human and economic 
resources to enforce rules regarding the use of a resource. 
The regulation of the hydrological cycle for the provision of potable water is a 
common application of the payment policy option, commonly known as payments for 
ecosystem services (PES). These instruments provide incentives for private landowners 
to provide ecosystem services through the protection of ecosystem structure, thereby 
making conservation a more attractive option. We can see examples of successful 
applications of this tool for drinking water provision in parts of the developing world, 
particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in the developed world. 
Drinking water for some of the world’s largest cities is currently being provided 
through PES or PES-like mechanisms, demonstrating that investing in natural capital 
makes economic and policy sense (Salzman, 2005). 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) share a unique set of sustainable 
development challenges due to their small size, topography, and relative isolation 
(Reynolds, DeSisto, Murray, & Kolodinsky, 2007; Tompkins et al., 2005). A 
significant challenge that SIDS face, is the management of water resources—access to 
freshwater resources being of primary concern (Cosgrove & Rijsberman, no date). 
Natural factors, a low degree of governance resulting in weak water policies, along 
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with limited institutional developments, all contribute to declining quality and quantity 
of freshwater in many SIDS (Kumar, 2005).  
Freshwater resources is an important national issue on the Caribbean island of 
Saint Lucia where water scarcity in rural areas during the dry season has reached 
critical capacity (Ministry of Physical Development Environment and Housing, 2004; 
Ministry of Planning Development Environment and Housing, 2001). Population 
growth, internal migration, and infrastructure development all contribute to rising water 
demand on the island. Without groundwater reserves, Saint Luica is completely 
dependent on rainfall for freshwater supplies. However, due to its steep topography and 
volcanic terrain, rain events cause high levels of run-off, sedimentation, erosion, gully 
formation, and landslides. A lack of natural catchments for water collection and storage 
for treated water compounds the challenge for the government to supply freshwater to 
communities.   
Saint Lucia’s unreliable water supply can be attributed not only to geologic and 
topographic constraints but also to institutional weaknesses in Saint Lucia’s water 
sector. Poor financial performance, operational efficiency, and low capital investment 
are currently overwhelming the water sector (Financial Private Sector and 
Infrastructure Department & Caribbean Country Management Unit, 2001). These 
natural and institutional factors interact with human activities at the watershed-level, 
further exacerbating environmental quality, thereby affecting water quality for 
downstream water users.  
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The current state of the water sector is detrimental not only to the health and 
welfare of Saint Lucia’s citizens, but also to the island’s economic development, which 
is strongly linked to its competive edge as a tourism destination. Agribusiness, formerly 
Saint Lucia’s primary component of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has declined from 
15% in 1990 to 5% in 2003, while tourism has assumed the role as principal contributor 
to the island’s economy (Sustainable Development Department & Caribbean Country 
Management Unit, 2007). The water and sanitation sector has emerged as a key limiting 
factor in realizing this development potential; access to basic services by developers 
and hoteliers is hindering their interest in investing in the island. The future of the 
Caribbean islands, the health and well-being of their populations, is dependent on a 
new, integrated approach to watershed management (UNDP-GEF IWCAM, 2005). 
Prescription has been the traditional approach to solving environmental problems; 
payments represent a promising new approach.   
Successful prescription through command-and-control mechanisms is 
determined by a country’s governmental and regulatory infrastructure, along with the 
nature of the environmental problem (Harrington & Morgenstern, 2004). Many 
regulatory approaches have failed in past 20 years, particularly in the developing world, 
because the governments generally lack the resources to mandate and proscribe 
behaviors, monitor compliance, and penalize those who do not comply. Employing 
penalties is a financial approach to altering behavior  by making certain activities more 
expensive through taxes or fees (Salzman, 2005). As with prescription, a certain level 
of governmental and institutional capacity is necessary to enforce penalties. Where the 
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punishable activities are closely linked to livelihoods and the means to pay is not there, 
penalties will not be an effective or just approach to environmental protection. 
Persuasion is an approach that utilizes information and public education to encourage a 
certain land ethic; persuasion is, in essence, self-regulation. While public education 
about ecosystem services is a critical piece of any environmental policy approach, 
without other economic alternatives, persuasion alone will not be sufficient for 
influencing landowners to achieve environmental goals. The privatization and 
allocation of access to a resource through property rights is not the appropriate solution 
for solving the freshwater crisis in the Caribbean. Freshwater is not the “tragedy of the 
commons” as with an open-access resource where the creation of property rights where 
they do not exist is a solution. The issue of freshwater in Saint Lucia is one of 
influencing private land use decisions—in other words, altering existing property 
rights—for the provision of ecosystem services, which proves to be more difficult.  
Of the “5 P’s,” payment appears to be an effective and feasible approach to 
watershed management. Payments provide an incentive to landowners to manage their 
land in a particular way for the delivery of desired ecosystem goods and services for 
public benefit. PES mechanisms represent an integrated approach and a potential 
solution to the unique environmental problems that concern SIDS.  
 
3.2 Goal 
The goal of this paper is to present payments as a policy option for the 
managers of the Integrated Water and Coastal Areas Management (IWCAM) program 
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in Saint Lucia to improve water quality in the Fond D’or watershed. I begin by 
describing the current state of freshwater in the Caribbean and the need for an 
innovative approach to protecting watershed ecosystem services. I then present a 
methodological approach to designing a payment mechanism, discussing the elements 
of the approach in the institutional and political context of Saint Lucia. Throughout the 
paper, I explore some of the opportunities and challenges associated with developing a 




3.3.1 Watershed Ecosystem Services 
John Wesley Powell described a watershed as "that area of land, a bounded 
hydrologic system, within which all living things are inextricably linked by their 
common water course and where, as humans settled, simple logic demanded that they 
become part of a community" (EPA, 2007). Due to the natural boundaries it creates, the 
watershed has become an appropriate unit within which to manage water resources and 
land uses that influence the quality and quantity of those resources.  
Watershed services are the benefits that humans derive from the watershed: the 
plant and animal biodiversity, as well as the goods and services that contribute to 
human welfare provided by the groups of ecosystems within the watershed (Smith, De 
Groot, & Bergkamp, 2006). Watersheds provide a variety of ecosystems services—
provisioning, regulatory, supporting, and cultural/amenity services—in one setting and 
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land users upstream determine the flow and quality of ecosystem services available to 
downstream beneficiaries. By regarding humans as beneficiaries of those ecosystem 
services there is enormous potential for protecting the ecosystems that provide those 
services (Brauman, Daily, Duarte, & Mooney, 2007). Through the lens of the 
ecosystem services framework, we can unite conservation and development by 
correlating environmental health to human health, security, and material goods 
necessary for well-being. 
Tackling SIDS’ current water quality and availability issues at the watershed 
scale through the ecosystem services framework is a logical approach because so many 
ecosystem processes are interlinked at the watershed level. 
3.3.2 Payments for Ecosystem Services 
PES mechanisms are an innovative direct approach to the conservation and 
improvement of ecosystem service provision. PES mechanisms facilitate a transaction 
between service buyers (beneficiaries) and sellers (providers) (Figure 3.1) that, 
theoretically, leads to larger social economic efficiency  (Corbera, Brown, & Adger, 
2007; Kosoy, Martinez-Tuna, Muradian, & Martinez-Alier, 2005). Particularly in parts 
of the developing world where livelihoods are closely linked to ecosystem goods and 
services and regulation through command-and-control conservation measures have 
proved unsuccessful, PES mechanisms are promising tools for altering land use 
behaviors that degrade the environment while promoting livelihoods (Kosoy et al., 
2005). A payment by downstream beneficiaries can help align land users’ incentives 
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with those of society by making conservation a more attractive option to upstream 
service providers (Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais, 2005). 
 
 
From: Pagiola, 2003. 
Figure 3. 1: Institutions, stakeholders, and the flow of payments in a PES mechanism  
PES is not a ‘silver bullet’ to solving current environmental and social 
problems; it is an appropriate tool only within a specific context and set of local 
conditions (Waage, Scherr, Jenkins, & Inbar, 2006). While it is impractical to duplicate 
a successful PES mechanism and apply it to another context, key lessons can be drawn 
from established PES programs and provide a set of considerations for designing a PES 
scheme in another context (Rosa, Kandel, & Dimas, 2003).  
Almost thirty percent of the world’s largest cities depend on forested 
watersheds for their water supply (Scherr, White, Khare, Inbar, & Molnar, 2004). As 
water demand is expected to double, even triple, in the next fifty years, especially in 
developing countries, the prospect for increased demand and increased payment for 
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watershed services is vast (Scherr et al., 2004). Examples of mechanisms based on the 
principles of PES have emerged from the field in recent years, particularly in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Pagiola, von Ritter, & Bishop, 2004). Costa Rica’s 
national pagos por servicios ambientales—payment for environmental services or 
PSA—program is one example that is partially funded through a tax on fuel sales and 
GEF grants, whereas local or regional watershed PES schemes are funded through 
water users’ fees. Similarly, Ecuador relies on voluntary payments by water users to 
supply FONAG, its water fund (Echavarria, 2002; Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002); New 
York City water users’ compensate upstream rural agricultural communities for 
management practices that provide clean drinking water (Landell-Mills & Porras, 
2002); Brazil allocates revenues from a sales tax to support the integrated management 
of the Rio Ribeira de Iguape Watershed in São Paulo (May, Neto, Denardin, & 
Loureiro, 2002; Rosa et al., 2003).  In Mexico’s PES for hydrological services program, 
the state makes payments as incentives to individuals and communities in over-
exploited watersheds for forest preservation (Alix-Garcia et al., 2005); and several of 
Bolivia’s PES-type systems for watershed protection have been spearheaded by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and funded  through a combination of fees, taxes, 
and trusts (Robertson & Wunder, 2005). 
In Saint Lucia, the private, but currently state-owned Water and Sewage 
Company, Inc (WASCO) provides drinking water, for which residents pay a monthly 
fee. Despite efforts to reform the water sector, WASCO’s current income does not 
cover the costs of water production and protection and current operations continue to be 
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plagued by a legacy of low rates and inadequate infrastructure (Geoghegan, 
Krishnarayan, Pantin, & Bass, 2003). A lack of human and financial resources has left 
the state unable to address these problems effectively. Given the obstacles that 
governments face in providing ecosystem services for their citizens, other policy 
mechanisms should be examined, including payment mechanisms (Whitten, Salzman, 
Shelton, & Proctor, 2003).  
 
3.4 Methodological Approach to Establishing PES 
Given the recent emergence of PES schemes for hydrological services around 
the globe, lessons drawn from these examples have contributed to the generation of a 
method for determining the feasibility of this approach in a specific context. Here I 
discuss the approach in terms of the Fond D'or watershed of Saint Lucia.  
 
3.4.1 Identify the ecosystem service and target conservation areas 
Before considering the design of a payment mechanism, we must first classify 
the desired ecosystem service(s) and the land use best thought to deliver the service(s) 
in order to prioritize sites for conservation. Biophysical assessments will aid in 
identifying water sources and measuring the flow and storage capacity. During the 
assessment, it is important to take into account water sources in relation to the 
placement of current water infrastructure such as tanks or catchments. Next, identify 
the land use or uses thought to best enhance or protect the provision of the desired 
ecosystem services. What degree of change is required to meet the target land use? Will 
71 
 
it require full reforestation of the site or adoption of environmentally friendly 
agricultural techniques such as agroforestry? Performance-based payments is a method 
in which landowners are rewarded for the degree of land use adopted, tailoring the 
payment to reflect the different ecosystem services provided by varying land uses. 
Watersheds are recognized contributors of important watershed services, but 
translating this understanding into action on the ground is difficult (Smith et al., 2006). 
First, the biophysical links between a specific land use and the ecosystem service 
outcomes may be unclear, especially in tropical forested watersheds. This has resulted 
in the emergence of myths regarding the forest-water linkage and policies based on 
those myths  (Robertson & Wunder, 2005). For example, one commonly accepted myth 
is that forest cover, compared to other vegetative cover, will always increase run-off. In 
actuality, forest cover usually decreases run-off more than agricultural crops, but trees 
may increase groundwater recharge. The result is that considerable scientific doubts 
surround biophysical linkages, and many of them are extremely complex and dependent 
on site-specific conditions. 
One notion at the core of the “traditional” role of forests is the “sponge” effect 
of the tree roots, leaf litter, and soil (Myers, 1983; Spears, 1982). The hydrological 
community long believed that trees act like sponges during wet periods, soaking up 
water and then releasing it during dry periods. This concept came under scrutiny in the 
early 1980’s and was followed by a heated debate on the hydrological role of forests 
(Bruijnzeel, 2004). Many of the underlying assumptions about the links between water 
and forests were debunked during the birth of a new and more “scientific” view of 
72 
 
tropical forest functioning. However, some important patterns generally hold true. The 
first being that water quality is easier to define, quantify, and measure than water 
quantity (Forest Trends, The Katoomba Group, & UNEP, 2008). Generally true is that 
the clearing of tropical forest cover will initially increase annual water yield, with 
maximum yield being reached at total clearing (Bruijnzeel, 2004; Forest Trends et al., 
2008). While water yield increases, a decrease in forest cover can lead to a reduction in 
rainfall infiltration resulting in strong declines in dry season flows. Another principle is 
that reforestation and soil conservation efforts can reduce peak flows and stormflows. 
Because landslides and mass wasting tend to occur more frequently in non-forested 
areas, it is commonly stated that good plant cover can generally prevent surface erosion 
and well-developed tree cover may reduce susceptibility for landslides (Bruijnzeel, 
2004; Forest Trends et al., 2008; Idol, 2003). The caveat to each of these principles is 
that local conditions—plant species, soil types, topography, and geology—will 
determine to what extent these main principles hold true at a specific site.  
To understand the biophysical linkages between land use and hyrdological 
functions, a full-scale assessment of hydrologic functions in the Fond D'or watershed 
may be necessary while a less technical assessment may also suffice. If researchers 
deem technical assessments necessary, these assessments could be costly or require 
additional researchers or specialists. Even when the biophysical links are clear, it is still 
questionable whether or not a particular land use practice will deliver the hypothesized 
benefits over time (Waage et al., 2006). In spite of this, the dynamic nature of forest 
ecosystems is not an obstruction to successfully targeting conservation efforts. Rather, 
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the PES design process can incorporate the variable nature of ecosystem functions for 
more effective results. 
Additionality is one of the principles of PES that requires knowledge of land 
use, before and after program implementation. Additionality is an indicator of the 
efficacy of a PES scheme by defining a baseline so that the effect of a PES can be 
measured in relation to that baseline (Wunder, 2005). In theory, a PES should prompt 
the desired change in land use; the change would not have occurred under a business-
as-usual scenario or without the incentive provided in the PES mechanism. Ideally, the 
payment scheme should target farmers not currently managing their lands in the 
environmentally-friendly manner assumed to provide the desired ecosystem service 
because additionally can be easily established (Alpizar, 2008). 
Additionality can be difficult to determine because of the complex nature of 
ecosystems; a change in land management might not yield immediate effects or other 
ecosystem components could be shaping the processes that are the end goal of a desired 
land use. If a landowner is managing in a way that provides the desired ecosystem 
services prior to the implementation of the PES scheme, we cannot establish 
additionality even though the environmental goals are being met. Since additionality is 
a requirement for participation in a PES transaction, those landowners would not be 
rewarded for their efforts to provide the ecosystem services even though they have been 
providing the services without compensation. The additionality requirement might offer 
perverse incentives for these landowners to change their land use or management to 
less-than-ideal practices in order to be eligible for the program. In this case, 
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additionality seems to be an ill-suited measure of efficacy and social equity in terms of 
attaining environmental goals. A valid approach to a payment scheme is a combination 
of payments to farmers to initiate the desired land use and payments to farmers to 
maintain provision of the service (Alpizar, 2008). Incorporating the dynamic nature of 
ecosystems into the PES design process is beneficial to determining additionality 
because natural variation can be built into the baseline measure. 
Conditionality is another principle of PES that can be more challenging to meet 
than additionality (Wunder, 2005). The conditionality principle states that the payment 
is made only if the service is delivered. Determining conditionality requires close 
monitoring and requires that the payments are truly contingent on service delivery, 
typically resulting in periodic payments rather than up-front payments or good-faith 
payments (Robertson & Wunder, 2005). Because ecosystem services are delivered 
temporally as well as spatially, they can be difficult to quantify and measure; even 
when it is possible to measure them, services may not be delivered for several years in 
a tropical reforestation scenario. This business-like aspect of PES has caused some 
resistance to adoption of PES schemes and the majority of existing payment schemes 
are determined to be PES-like initiatives due to the lack of conditionality (Wunder, 
2005). 
Performance-based payments assuage some of the challenges associated with 
additionality and conditionality because the level of payment is determined by land use 
practices and the costs of implementing a certain land use. With this type of payment 
scheme, landowners are rewarded for the degree of conservation land use adopted. 
75 
 
Payments for conversion to a land use ideal for providing hydrological services will 
differ from payments to maintain a land use currently providing the same services 
because the costs associated with realizing those land uses vary. This practice 
establishes a direct connection between land use, investment, and payment.  
In the Fond D’or watershed, the first step to implementing a payment scheme is 
to perform land use and hydrological assessments, whether technical or informal. After 
classifying the desired land use or uses and determing the feasibility of converting parts 
of the watershed to that land use, we can then prioritize areas for conservation. Priority 
conservation areas might be those nearest to water sources, particularly degraded 
portions of the watershed, or land where agricultural practices are having a 
considerable effect on water quality. The next step is to work with the farmers or 
landowners of these sites to understand the costs of service provision and their 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) compensation for removing agriculture or shifting land 
use near water sources. 
 
3.4.2 Estimating the costs of service provision 
Landowners make land use decisions regarding the net benefits of one land use 
and the net costs of switching to another land use. The costs of ecosystem service 
provision are the costs associated with implementing the ideal land use (the land use 
best thought to deliver the desired ecosystem services), known as implementation costs, 
and opportunity costs, which are the foregone benefits of the alternative land use. 
Implementation costs will vary depending on the change in land use necessary to 
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achieve the desired land use—full land use conversion or partial land use conversion. 
Full land use conversion, will have higher implementation costs if the desired land use 
is radically different from the original land use and requires proactive measures, such as 
the tilling of soil or planting of trees in a former slash-and-burn agriculture setting. 
Afforestation of land previously used for slash-and-burn agriculture will also have high 
opportunity costs because of the inevitable loss of income from crop production.  
In the first step, we investigate the biophysical links between current 
agricultural land use and water service provision, identify an ideal land use that will 
improve service delivery, and locate sites for conservation. Before estimating 
implementation and opportunity costs, we will have an idea of the scale of land use 
change necessary to achieve the ideal land use. Partial land use change may involve 
adoption of an agroforestry system or full land use conversion may mean the removal 
of crops for natural or active reforestation of the site.  
Agricultural land use in the Fond D’or watershed consists mostly of banana and 
other fruit tree plantations and root crops like yam and dasheen. According to recent 
national data compiled by the Saint Lucia Ministry of Agriculture, the annual 
opportunity cost per acre of yams and dasheen is EC $32,418 ($12,142 US) (Table 3.1). 
Data on agricultural land under banana production was not available; therefore, the 
opportunity cost for banana plantations is undetermined. 
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Table 3.1: Opportunity cost of agricultural land producing yam and dasheen 
Item/Operation Unit Quantity Unit Prices Total Cost 
Land Clearing Man Days 8 50 400 
Ploughing Man Days 15 50 750 
Planting Material 
Preparation Man Days 2 50 100 
Planting Man Days 8 50 400 
Fertilizing Man Days 6 50 300 
Weed Control Man Days 35 50 1750 
Pest and Disease Control Man Days 4 50 200 
Harvesting Days Man Days 8 50 400 
Treating and Storing Man Days 2 50 100 
Transportation Trips 3 80 240 
Fertilizer Bags 30 90 2700 
Lime Bags 10 30 300 
Planting Material Plants 6969 0.3 2090.7 
TOTAL    9730.7 
Marketing yields Lbs. 18150 1.25 22687.5 
PROFIT (per acre)    
EC $32,418.2 or 
$ 12,141.65 US 
 
While a recent UVM research project sought to understand household support 
for a PES mechanism in the Fond D’or watershed, farmer, and landowner attitudes 
towards participation in a PES mechanism and their WTA compensation remains 
undetermined. This piece of information is critical for determining the feasibility of 
implementing PES. Participation in a PES is voluntary; as a result, the success of the 
strategy relies on participation and WTA. 
Knowing the opportunity cost for alternative land uses will help determine 
which groups should be given priority as service sellers in the negotiation of a payment 
scheme (Smith et al., 2006). Payment schemes in Brazil and Costa Rica reveal that the 
opportunity cost of livestock farmers exceeds the maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
of downstream service buyers, whereas the opportunity cost to the agricultural sector is 
more comparable to potential payments. In this case, there is little economic 
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justification to involve the livestock farmers in a payment program unless other 
objectives, such as social equity, take precedence. Comparing the opportunity costs can 
provide insight into the negotiation of a fair price that will influence behavior of those 
groups willing to participate (Smith et al., 2006). However, supply-side and demand-
side valuation is not always necessary to negotiate a price; any mutally agreed upon 
price can be the "right price" for the parties (Wunder, 2005). 
3.4.2.1 Land Tenure 
 The opportunity for farmers to participate in payment programs is limited where 
land tenure is uncertain. In fact, insecure land tenure is the primary barrier to the 
implementation of incentives for watershed services in developing nations (Ferraro & 
Kiss, 2002; Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). Clearly established property rights, whether 
through formal or customary law, are the foundation of payment program for watershed 
services (Smith et al., 2006). Clear property rights, as well as water access and use 
rights, make it possible to negotiate contracts, monitor, and enforce those contracts 
(Smith et al., 2006). 
 The 1973/74 Saint Lucia agricultural census indicated that 70.6% of all 
landholdings were "owned or held in ownerlike possession" and no less than 92.6% of 
agricultural land was under such holding, indicating a reasonably stable agricultural 
sector (OAS, 2005). Landholders who rent were nearly 50% of all in the Dennery 
district, within which the Fond D’or watershed is located. More recent literature 
discusses Saint Lucia’s “family-land” system, which dominates agricultural land tenure 
with 52% of the agricultural land area under that form of tenure (GOSL, 2003; Vargas, 
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2002). Family land is a form of communal ownership among members of a family 
wherein an undefined number of heirs hold share in the land without physical division 
of the property among members (GOSL, 2003; Vargas, 2002). Advantages of the 
family land system are equal access to the land, flexibility in land use, and non-
monetary welfare benefits (GOSL, 2003). This system also creates constraints for 
social mobility and empowerment in rural areas in the case of disputes or where 
collateral, in the form of land, is necessary to obtain credit. This type of ownership may 
be an obstacle to conservation or the adoption of best agricultural practices. It presents 
a challenge to designing a payment program; with a number of legal owners, it may 
pose difficult to identify a particular party to enter into a contract with. It will also be 
challenging if the parties do not agree on the future management of the land.  
 Other recent trends in land tenure in Saint Lucia that may impact the feasibility 
of a payment program is land speculation that drives up land prices beyond what the 
productivity of the land justifies, and the continued fragmentation of small parcels 
(GOSL, 2003). Another phenomenon is distorted land distribution whereby 93% of all 
farmers control only 24% of the land and 0.17% of farmers—mostly absentee 
owners—control 50% of land available for cultivation. Working with absentee 
landowners may pose a challenge, but may be necessary since they own half of the 
cultivable land.   
If there are many landholders with small parcels, a payment program may 
necessitate a number of them be involved in order to achieve the conservation goals of 
the targeted areas identified in step one. A high number of service “sellers” will 
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increase transaction costs, reducing the efficiency of the payment transaction. This 
problem can be reduced by grouping small landholders together into associations or 
cooperatives where a representative may negotatiate on behalf of the group and, in turn, 
arrange individual contracts with group members (Smith et al., 2006). Sub-contracting 
such as this will require special care; it can be difficult to monitor compliance from 
everyone and a contract may be at risk where one member fails to comply. 
 While it seems that much of land in Saint Lucia is under some type of stable 
land tenure, each type of land tenure will require a different logistical approach to the 
payment strategy. Investigating land tenure particular to the farmers in the Fond D'or 
watershed is an important component of understanding the feasibility of a payment 
mechanism. 
  
3.4.3 Estimating demand for ecosystem services 
In order to establish an incentive mechanism, we must recognize the goods and 
services provided by the watershed as assets with a price. Demand for those assets can 
be determined by identifying clear beneficiaries and for each group of beneficiaries, 
estimating their maximum WTP. Beneficiaries include stakeholders from the public 
and private sector and the local, regional, and global scale: residents of the watershed, 
hydropower producers, water bottling companies, farmer or irrigator groups, and the 
tourism industry to name a few. Once beneficiaries at all scales have been identified, 
we must determine which group has the greatest incentive to pay for the alteration of 
landowners' decisions (Pearce & Moran, 1994). 
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Researchers from the University of Vermont (UVM) used the contingent 
valuation method (CVM) to investigate household WTP in a study conducted in 
January 2008. The surveys presented respondents with a hypothetical payment scheme 
in which an additional fee on a household’s monthly water bill be allocated to farmers 
for reforestation of the upper watershed around water sources; respondent WTP was 
estimated through a series of dichotomous questions containing increasing payment 
levels. The results of the survey reveal a positive attitude towards a reforestation 
program with improved water quality being one potential benefit; 74% of households 
were willing-to-pay an additional amount on their water bill to support a reforestation 
program, with mean household WTP estimated at EC $4.88 ($1.84 US) per month. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the highest amount that households are willing-to-pay.  
 
 
Figure 3. 2: Household WTP 
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Respeated studies reveal that stated WTP significantly exceeds actual WTP 
(Goldar & Misra, 2001; Kealy, Dovidio, & Rockel, 1988; Loomis, Brown, Lucero, & 
Peterson, 1996; Neill, Cummings, Ganderton, Harrison, & McGuckin, 1994; Reynolds, 
2007). While the disparity between stated WTP and actual WTP varies depending on 
the commodity being valued and the study design, 50% is a common over-estimate. 
After adjusting for this differential, the annual contribution to a conservation payment 
program through an increase in water users’ fees for the approximate 3,000 households 
(Saint Lucia Government Statistics Department, 2001) in the watershed is roughly EC 
$1,000,000 or $400,000 US.  While households represent one potential funding source 
for a payment mechanism, other sources exist. I discuss alternative arrangements in the 
financial mechanism section. 
The hypothetical scenario in the household survey utilized WASCO as a broker 
between the buyers (residents) and the sellers (farmers). This type of arrangement is an 
example of a monopsony, where an organization acts as a single buyer on behalf of 
many buyers, and is common to many watershed PES schemes because it is more 
efficient when there are many buyers and sellers of the service. In other arrangements, 
as in the scenario, maximum WTP for each group of beneficiaries must be determined. 
A price can then be politically negotiated between the buyers and sellers; the price 
(payments) must be enough to cover the costs of adopting the land use but should be 
smaller than aggregated WTP (Alpizar, 2008).  
 
3.4.4. Financial mechanism 
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A variety of financing options are available to support a payment mechanism, as 
demonstrated by payment schemes around the world. In Costa Rica, a regional scheme 
in the Heredia watershed uses a system where water users pay an environmental fee on 
their water bill to the Heredia Public Service Enterprise (ESPH), a private water utility 
through public concession. ESPH created PROCUENCAS, a program to administer the 
transfer of funds directly to landowners to adopt sustainable land management practices 
(International Institute for Environment and Development, 2007; Smith et al., 2006). 
Colombia instituted new taxes to fund its PES initiative. Similarly, Costa Rica uses a 
fuel tax, in addition to international grants and loans, to funds its national program for 
the provision of four ecosystem services, whereas in Brazil, the state transfers funds 
collected through a sales tax to the municipalities based on the size and quality of their 
conservation areas (Wunder, 2005). These examples demonstrate that a variety of 
arrangements is possible; it is a matter of which arrangement or arrangements are the 
most feasible and will provide a sustainable source of funding given local conditions in 
the Fond D’or watershed.  
3.4.4.1 Private payment scheme-water users 
The UVM household WTP survey investigated the potential for financing the 
PES mechanism through an increase in water users’ fees and discovered that the 
majority of residents were willing to pay. The scenario used the government (WASCO) 
as a broker between the buyers and sellers, collecting fees from water users (buyers); 
fees imposed by water-based enterprises (e.g. water suppliers, hydroelectric companies) 
is an approach currently used in New York City, Romania, Costa Rica, and Brazil 
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(Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). These schemes are examples of monopsonies. Where 
transaction costs are high and there are many buyers and sellers, monosopic schemes—
a single buyer—are common and most efficient (Wunder, 2005). In the case of the 
multiplicity of services produced by a watershed, there exists the potential for a great 
number of buyers and sellers and, therefore, high transaction costs. A hydroelectric 
company, brewery, water bottling company, or tourism operator are examples of 
potential buyers in a monopsonic scheme for the ecosystem services provided by a 
watershed. Where transaction costs are high, keeping buyers and sellers to a minimum 
might be the most appropriate option (Wunder, 2005).  
Another approach where there are many buyers is the concept of pooling 
demand. Water users in Quito, Ecuador and outlying areas pay different rates for water 
depending on whether or not they extract (International Institute for Environment and 
Development, 2007). This includes farmers, domestic water users, hydroelectric 
companies, tourism operators, and industrial water users. Others involved are private 
corporations (a brewery and electricity producer) and the national government 
(irrigation project). The benefit of pooling demand for services that have a diversity of 
beneficiaries at different scales is that there are more potential financing sources for 
conservation interventions, the ability to secure sufficient funds at any given time is 
increased, as well as the likelihood of making financing self-sustaining into the future. 
3.4.4.2 Private payment scheme-tourism 
Revenues from tourism are another source of financing for a payment program. 
A contingent valuation survey aimed at Saint Lucia tourists conducted by UVM 
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researchers in January 2008 reveals that the majority of vacationers on the island are 
willing to contribute to one or more policy measures intended to improve the condition 
of watersheds and coastlines: 1) exit tax; 2) park entrance fees; and/or 3) a rooms and 
meals tax. Examples from the Caribbean demonstrate that tourism is a sustainable 
source of conservation financing. Belize allocates $3.75 US from an airport departure 
tax to the Protected Areas Conservation Trust and a 20% commission on cruise ship 
passenger fees (Belize Tourism Industry Association, 2007); meanwhile, the Turks and 
Caicos designate 1% of a 9% hotel tax to support the maintenance and protection of the 
island’s protected areas (Spergel, 2001). Fees targeting users of marine resources—
boats, yachts, divers—are used to finance protection of the Rhone Marine Park in the 
British Virgin Islands, Saba Marine Park in The Netherlands Antilles, and Pigeon 
Island National Historic Park and the Soufreire Marine Management Area, both in 
Saint Lucia (Geoghegan, 1998). A study in the Turks and Caicos indicated that high 
fees can be sustained if the marine site is comprised of high quality coral reefs 
(Lindberg, 2001). 
Reinforcing the importance of healthy coastal ecosystems to the tourism 
industry and to Saint Lucia’s economy, a recent study by the World Resources Institute 
(WRI) found that one-quarter of Saint Lucia’s tourists dive or snorkel during their visit; 
the resulting contribution to the national economy has been estimated at US $91 million 
(Burke, Greenhalgh, Prager, & Cooper, 2008). Additionally, WRI estimates that 
satisfaction derived above what tourists paid is US $2.3 million. The economic 
importance of reef ecosystems to the national economy is clear, not only for tourism 
86 
 
but for local resident use—estimated to be between US $52 and $109 million. Given 
SIDS’ unique topography that directly links ridges to reefs, the IWCAM approach is 
not only essential to alleviating negative impacts to coastal areas from upstream 
activities, the funds allocated for watershed improvement have a great to chance of 
positively impacting reef ecosystems. Tourism, Saint Lucia’s primary economic 
activity represents a larger financial contribution to a payment mechanism than do 
domestic water users, with increased likelihood of being a self-sustaining financing 
mechanism. 
 
3.4.4.3 Public payment schemes 
The Government of Saint Lucia is also a potential source of funding for a 
payment mechanism. Such a program could be of interest to the government because 
potable water is an issue of public importance and has direct impacts on public health 
and labor productivity (Alpizar, 2008). A recent report by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) supports this, asserting that the economic return of investing in 
drinking water and sanitation is 10-fold (Pruss-Ustun, Bos, Gore, & Bartram, 2008). 
Some of the global benefits of this investment would be health care savings of US $7 
billion for agencies and US $340 million for individuals; 320 productive days gained 
each year for people between the ages of 15-59 years, resulting in productivity gains of 
US $9.9 billion a year. While these figures are global estimates, they illustrate that the 
economic returns from investing in drinking water and sanitation are great; individual 
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countries, such as Saint Lucia, would likely see returns for their own countrywide 
efforts.  
With a government-funded health care program, such as in Saint Lucia, the 
costs of a PES mechanism could be considered a preventative health measure that will 
perhaps save money on state health care expenditures and increase labor productivity in 
the long run. According to WHO, the per captial expenditure on health care by the 
Government of Saint Lucia was 5.9% of GDP in 2005; total expenditure on health in 
2005 was $397  US; the government assumes 56.2% of the costs while individuals 
cover the remaining 43.8% (Pruss-Ustun et al., 2008; World Health Organization, 
2005). Improvements to water quality may produce positive health benefits, thereby 
decreasing the government and individual expenditures on health. 
A PES scheme might also be more cost-effective than constructing new water 
treatment facilities and infrastructure, the costs of which would be shouldered by 
WASCO. The New York City Water Authority implemented a rate increase to help 
fund several conservation programs—easements, reduced development rights, and 
other eco-friendly practices— in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds that provide the 
city with drinking water after determining that this to be more cost-effective than 
building a water treatment facility. The avoided infrastructure costs would have 
doubled the cost of water for NYC users; the city avoided $4-6 billion US in 
infrastructure and $300-500 million US in ongoing expenses (Langton, 2006). 
A 2007 UVM study conducted in the Talvan watershed of Saint Lucia estimated 
that the annual cost of using PAX-18, a chemical that increases the settling rate of 
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sediment, plus labor costs, is $27, 891 US (adjusted from 2006 USD) or EC $73,074 
(Alkire, Kerchner, Sadoff, & Skaskiw, 2007). Sedimentation has other costs as well; 
the cleaning of silt-laden screens at water treatment facilities results in the loss of 
approximately 120,000 gallons of treated water per week (Alkire et al., 2007). 
Improved upstream land management practices in conjunction with reforestation could 
significantly reduce sedimention and downstream wastewater treatment costs of using 
PAX-18, as well as a decrease in the loss of treated water. Reduced siltation in the 
pipes would also decrease the number of days in the rainy season in which water 
treatment facilities shut down, positively impacting water availability for residents. 
3.4.4.4 Bundled services 
Because tropical forested watersheds provide a multiplicity of ecosystem 
services and beneficiaries at a variety of geographic and temporal scales enjoy the flow 
of those services, a PES mechanism can facilitate a payment for a bundle of services, 
rather than a singular service. Bundling services is one way to ensure sustainable 
funding for a PES mechanism. It not only makes long-term fiscal sense for financing a 
PES mechanism, it reflects the fact that ecosystem services are frequently in joint 
production so that investment in the production of one service will often result in the 
simultaneous production of other services (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). Figure 3.3 
illustrates the number of PES mechanisms in the forest sector for a variety of different 
ecosystem services, illustrating the opportunities to bundle similar services in a 
payment program.  
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Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) reviewed 28 cases of PES programs that provide 
bundled services; 11 of the cases are located in Latin America and the Caribbean. They 
found that 50% of the cases involved the bunding of two services with the most 
common pairing being carbon sequestration potential and biodiversity protection, 18% 
involved three services, and 29% involved four services. One example is Costa Rica’s 
national PSA which recognizes four services provided by forests: carbon, biodiversity, 
watershed protection, and landscape beauty (Landell-Mills & Porras, 2002). Annual 
payments to private forest owners in Costa Rica's PSA vary according to the activity 
adopted: reforestation ($450 US/hectare), sustainable management of forest ($320 
US/hectare), and forest preservation ($200 US/hectare). 
 
From: Davis, 2008 
Figure 3. 3: PES programs in the forest sector by service. 
 
If the goal of implementing a payment mechanism in the Fond D’or watershed of 
Saint Lucia is to ensure that land stewards are compensated for the suite of services 
they provide, then the bundled approach makes the most sense. To provide a sense of 
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the value of some of the other ecosystem services provided by the Fond D’or 
watershed, the World Bank estimates that deforested tropical land used for pasture 
worth $200-500 US per acre could be worth $1,500-$10,000 US if left in tact and used 
to offset carbon emissions of industrialized nations (Chomitz, 2007).  
Tropical forests have value beyond their carbon sequestration potential: tropical 
forests most likely contain half of the world's biodiversity (Pearce, 2001). Islands, with 
a generally high degree of species endemism, play a vital role in supporting global 
biodiversity. Biodiversity serves different functions within an ecosystem—life support 
funtions, production functions, carrier functions, and information functions (Nunes, 
Van Den Bergh, & Nijkamp, 2001). Therefore, the value of biodiversity differs 
depending on the function being valued and the valuation orientation: value of 
biodiversity to human welfare (anthropocentric) or intrinsic value (biocentric or 
ecocentric). While the total economic value of biodiversity is boundless, the more 
meaningful measure is marginal economic value, or the value per unit of land area, 
which may be small (Pearce, 2001). And as stated earlier, coral reef tourism accounts 
for direct and indirect economic impact totalling US$ 160–194 million in St. Lucia 
(Burke et al., 2008). Together these values demonstrate that the ecosystem services 
provided by the Fond D'or watershed of Saint Lucia have a potentiallly high value and, 
therefore, we should consider a payment mechanism for bundled services. 
3.4.5 Legal and Institutional Framework 
Scale—institutional, political, and geographic—is an issue critical to PES 
mechanisms because we must identify and understand the resource flows, beneficiaries, 
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and the links between them; an institution of equal scale must then oversee the 
payments. This can be challenging because institutional capacity is generally smaller 
than a watershed, with the institions typically residing in cities or towns within the 
watershed. Geographic scale is a challenge because many ecosystem services have 
beneficiaries at more than one scale—local, regional, and/or global. A spatial map that 
illustrates resource flows and links to beneficiaries at different scales will help to 
overcome this challenge. The biophysical scale for water purity is the watershed and 
while watersheds come in all shapes and sizes, they are generally distinct units of a 
local or regional extent. The Fond D’or watershed being one of seven major watersheds 
on Saint Lucia, an island nation 616 square kilometers in size, offers an opportunity for 
PES because of its limited size and scale.  
Environmental problems do not reside within man-made political boundaries, 
and as a result, the institutional and political scale of a PES must match the scale of 
resource or conservation efforts (Alpizar, 2008; Salzman, 2005). Institutions, whether 
formal or informal, are necessary to oversee the payments. The institutions involved 
establish accountability and transparency for the mechanism; the stakeholders must be 
confident that the revenues flowing into a PES scheme are managed properly and are 
going to the anticipated use (Waage et al., 2006). Examples where PES mechanisms are 
effective or promising all exhibit strong institutional conditions. For developing 
countries, where governance is low and social and institutional developments are 
emerging, a functioning legal and institutional system for a payment mechanism may 
be difficult to realize (Kumar, 2005).  
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Direct upstream-downstream negotiations are the most straightforward way of 
negotating payments for ecosystem services; however, these cases are rare and the use 
of brokers and intermediaries are common (Smith et al., 2006). At a minimum, the 
intermediary institution should be capable of reaching arrangements with service 
providers, monitor contracts, manage and disburse funds, determine whether 
conditionality has been met, and enforce penalties for violating the rules (Alpizar, 
2008). The intermediary will seek to maximize downstream service buyers' demand by 
identifying sellers who will deliver the greatest improvement at the lowest cost (Smith 
et al., 2006). The supervisory institition must also consider possible perverse incentives 
during negotiations with service sellers and create arrangements to mitigate the 
potential negative effects of such incentives. 
Every payment scheme must include measures for compliance and enforcement 
to ensure that all parties are fulfilling their agreed-to obligations (Smith et al., 2006). 
The intermediary must conduct monitoring to assess compliance in a way that is neutral 
and transparent. For a payment scheme to be credible the powers of enforcement must 
be clearly designated in the legal framework and there must be disincentives for non-
complying parties (Smith et al., 2006). In the San Juan de Pimampiro, Ecuador, a 
national NGO, the Ecological Foundation for the Development of Renewable Natural 
Resources (CEDERENA), is undertaking a pilot payment program to construct 
incentives for farmers to conserve forests (Smith et al., 2006). Landowners who violate 
their contract initially have their payment suspended for a quarter; subsequent 
violations lead to suspensions and, eventually, exclusion from the program. 
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 If there are a significant number of stakeholders, the transaction costs will be 
high. High transaction costs limit access to the program by deterring small landholders 
from becoming involved (Pagiola et al., 2005). In this case, effective intermediaries are 
necessary to limit the transaction costs for all parties involved (Waage et al., 2006). 
Effective intermediaries are those that can act as honest brokers, local NGOs or 
community groups that work locally and are known and trusted by the stakeholders 
(Smith et al., 2006). Local governments, water utilities or water boards usually have the 
financial and technical capacity and the legal authority to act as intermediaries (Alpizar, 
2008). Relying on established institutions will help keep transaction costs at a 
minimum. As mentioned earlier, a monopsonic scheme is generally most efficient 
where there are many buyers and sellers of the service, and is common in PES schemes 
around the world.  
While the author's knowledge of existing Saint Lucian institutions is limited, 
there are several known groups in the Fond D’or watershed that could potentially serve 
as intermediaries between the buyers and sellers of the service, oversee the transactions, 
distribute payments, and monitor and enforce the contract. The IWCAM office (locally 
known as the Mabouya Valley Development Committee) is a familiar and well-
regarded group within the watershed communities. The Mabouya Valley Development 
Committee has organized a local watershed committee composed of representatives 
from each community. This watershed committee is currently undertaking a pilot 
rainwater harvesting project (IWCAM, 2008); this project serves to potentially raise 
awareness about the group and gain momentum for future watershed protection 
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projects. The watershed committee representatives are local community members that 
could serve as monitoring and enforcement agents for the agreement. The members are 
local and accountable to the public, which will help create a sense of social obligation 
to adhere to the norms set out in the agreement. Lastly, it is crucial to involve WASCO 
in the design and implementation of a payment mechanism. Up until now, WASCO has 
refrained from collaborating with the IWCAM project. Current water infrastructure is 
in need of improvements and the beneficiaries of a PES scheme will not fully receive 
the water quality benefits of the PES scheme without properly maintained 
infrastructure. Most importantly, WASCO has the legal and financial capacity to act as 
a broker in a payment transaction; monthly collection of water fees is in effect, making 
WASCO the most logical choice for an intermediary. Evidence from UVM's household 
WTP survey reveals strong opinions regarding WASCO and a general distrust of 
WASCO among the communities in the Fond D'or watershed. Public support and trust 
could be a barrier to success if using WASCO as an intermediary in a payment scheme. 
An institutional analysis in the Fond D'or watershed will increase understanding 
of existing institutional capacity, interest, and influence, while helping negotiators 
decide which parties need to be involved in the payment scheme and in which roles 
(Smith et al., 2006). The institutional analysis will identify how institutions link to, and 
influence, buyers and sellers of watershed services and highlight alterations to the 
institutional structure needed for a payment scheme to function properly. Negotiators 
will address gaps in the institutional framework identified during the analysis prior to 
implementing a payment scheme. This may result in the emergence of new insitutions 
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or groups. In Colombia, downstream water users ascertained that institutions were not 
able to effectively address their interests in the protection of watershed services; as a 
result, they created water users' associations to encourage watershed management 
(Smith et al., 2006). In Costa Rica's national payment scheme for watershed services, 
participation of a private hydropower company is made possible by a set of institutions 
that link landowners and consumers; each institution plays a specific role in the 
structure of the payment scheme (Smith et al., 2006). 
 
3.5 Conclusion and Recommendation 
This article submits that payments are a potential policy approach for the 
IWCAM program in Saint Lucia while acknowledging the site- and context-specific 
nature of PES and the challenges and limitations associated with this approach. This 
article outlines the essential steps to creating a payment scheme; the establishment of a 
successul payment scheme will require that these steps be taken in a logical and 
consistent manner. Generally, it is the responsibility of the intermediary organizations 
to coordinate the recommended actions, building upon each step to create an organized 
scheme. Throughout, managers should remain focused on the creation of incentives that 
will change the behavior of landowners whose actions affect watershed services. 
Managers must also engage stakeholders throughout the process, working together to 
shift priorities, appraise the outcomes, and adapt efforts if needed. Smith et al. (2006) 
refers to this as a "social learning process." 
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For the IWCAM program in the Fond D’or watershed of Saint Lucia, best bets 
for developing a payment mechanism involve developing a local or regional transaction 
for water quality, utilizing existing institutions with the technical and financial 
resources and political will to act as intermediaries. This will increase the efficiency of 
the transaction and legitimacy of the program. We should compare and consider 
arrangements between different groups of buyers and sellers for their respective 
transaction and opportunity costs, as well as the likelihood for sustainable financing. 
We must also investigate other causes of market failure, such as local capacity and 
willingness to participate, prior to implementation. Stakeholder involvement and 
environmental awareness are also key components to the process. 
The bottom line is that potable water is of importance to human well-being; some 
even consider access to clean water a human right. While PES programs are promising 
measures for the provision of hydrological services in the developing world, the reality 
is that existing market failures, fragmented water utilities, and deteriorating water 
infrastructure are barriers to implementing successful schemes.  
In summary, I recommend the following steps to further examine the feasibility of 
a payment mechanism in the Fond D’or watershed: 
1. Gather biophysical information on water quality and land use impacts on 
water quality; delineate the ideal land use(s) that have been determined to 
deliver the ecosystem services of interest. 
2. Prioritize sites for conservation; priority should be given to areas that have 
the potential to provide ecosystem services but are not currently being 
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managed in a way to provide the ecosystem services of interest. Farmers 
currently using best practices on their land should also be included to 
maintain service provision and to avoid perverse incentives. 
3. Identify and map beneficiaries spatially to include the local, regional, and 
global scales. These beneficiaries should include not only beneficiaries of 
water quality but also those that benefit from a bundle of ecosystem services 
provided by the watershed. Examine beneficiaries from both the private and 
public sectors; estimate maximum WTP for each group of beneficiaries. 
4. Further examine potential funding mechanisms for a PES for water quality 
and/or bundled services and the legal, financial and institutional 
requirements associated with different options. This will include examining 
international carbon markets, funding through international grants and loans, 
and private payments from the tourism industry, hydroelectricity producers, 
or water bottlers. A blend of several mechanisms may be necessary for the 
scheme to be financially self-sustaining. 
5. Identify transaction and opportunity costs, keeping in mind that 
arrangements that limit transaction costs and arrangements where 
opportunity costs are not too high are more attractive to participants as well 
as fiscally feasible. 
6. Work with local communities to investigate WTA and identify local capacity 
constraints to participation in a PES scheme. Education about ecosystem 
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services and information stressing voluntary participation in the mechanism 
is essential. 
While this paper does not conclude that a payment mechanism in the Fond D’or 
watershed is or is not feasible at this time, it outlines the steps to be taken in order to 
reach such a conclusion. It synthesizes critical information regarding PES for 
consideration by Saint Lucian policymakers. This paper demonstrates that the Fond 
D'or watershed delivers important ecosystem services to a host of beneficiaries; a 
payment mechanism is one potential way to mitigate the further loss of important 
ecosystem services by connecting beneficiaries to service providers, compensating 
them for their efforts. 
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Given the complexity and urgency of today’s environmental and social 
problems, we cannot wait until we have conclusive scientific knowledge to formulate 
policies to address them. The best course of action is to proceed with current 
knowledge about natural ecosystems’ contribution to human welfare, generating 
policies that can adapt to increases in knowledge and shifting social and political 
climates. Science, in this sense, is post-normal. Ecosystem valuation and PES are 
examples of post-normal science. The goal of these tools is to promote both natural 
ecosystems and human livelihoods in mutually beneficial arrangement, where stakes 
are high, using best available knowledge. 
The first article, “Willingness-to-Pay for Reforestation in the Fond D’or 
Watershed, Saint Lucia,” illustrates how ecosystem valuation aids in understanding the 
value of ecosystem services that are not valued in the traditional marketplace. We used 
the contingent valuation method (CVM) to understand Saint Lucian residents’ 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reforestation of the watershed for the protection of 
critical watershed services, namely water quality. A team of trained survey 
administrators from University of Vermont and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries of Saint Lucia delivered a survey to households in five community groups 
in the Fond D’or watershed in January 2008. Surveys questions inquired into their 
domestic water source(s) and uses, water availability and WTP an additional amount on 
their monthly water bill to support reforestation of the watershed. In addition, we asked 
respondents about their satisfaction with the quality and quantity of the water they 
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currently receive, their opinions on the status of drinking water in the valley, and if the 
cost of their water service is fair for the quality and quantity of water they receive. We 
also collected demographic information at the end of the interview.   
We collected a total 294 surveys for a 95% confidence level. Of the 294 
respondents, 74% indicated that they are willing to pay an extra amount on their 
monthly water bill to support a watershed reforestation program. We calculated the 
mean WTP per household for the hypothetical reforestation scenario to be EC $4.88 per 
month ($1.84 US). In addition to WTP, 94% of respondents think that compensation 
should be given to farmers for participating in a program that requires them to take land 
out of production for reforestation.  
Despite evidence from the literature that WTP is a factor of socioeconomic 
characteristics— higher education and income levels will lead to increased WTP—we 
cannot confidently assert that education or income are factors influencing WTP among 
the residents of the Fond D’or watershed. The only variables that are shown to have a 
significant relationship to WTP are residence in community group 3, and respondent's 
opinion on whether the tap water they receive is suitable for household needs. Further 
analysis of the individual community group variables reveals that attitudes and opinions 
about water quality and quantity are defining characteristics of the community groups. 
A high number of residents were willing to pay the highest bid amount of EC 
$15 ($5.68 US), or more. Fourteen of those 47 respondents reside in community group 
3. While education was not determined to be an influential factor of overall WTP, 




The analysis of survey data presented here suggests that WTP by residents in 
the Fond D’or watershed is a factor of their attitudes and opinions about current water 
quality and quantity rather than demographic variables such as ability-to-pay. Water 
quality and quantity appear to vary by location in the watershed with water 
infrastructure and WASCO management presence. Therefore, residence in a particular 
community group likely influences opinions on water quality and quantity. 
While researchers typically use CVM to estimate non-use values of ecosystems 
or estimate the damage to natural ecosystems, we used CVM in the household surveys 
to estimate the potential household contribution to an economic incentive program for 
reforestation in the Fond D’or watershed. Estimating beneficiaries' contribution to 
program development is not estimating non-use values. Therefore, this application of 
CVM was not susceptible to the myriad of criticisms and sources of error embedded in 
the typical uses of CVM. However, studies have repeatedly demonstrated that stated 
WTP signifcantly exceeds revealed WTP, oftentimes by 50%. After adjusting for this 
differential, the potential annual contribution from an increase in water users’ fees is 
approximately EC $1,000,000 or $400,000 US. 
CVM can be used as an educational tool, helping people define and understand 
their attitudes and preferences towards the environment. The hypothetical scenario 
presentated respondents with information regarding the importance of ecosystem 
services in the watershed for downstream communities, assisting people in forming 
preferences for public environmental goods for which they may not have had prior 
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preferences. Increased environmental awareness could potentially raise support for 
other environmental improvement projects on the island and contribute to the 
development of a public environmental ethos.  
The results of the household survey reveal not only a monetary estimate of 
WTP, but also a shared attitude towards environmental improvement. The WTP dollar 
estimate, as well as public support inferred from the survey, can inform policy makers 
who will be evaluating the costs and benefits of various alternatives that will cause 
changes in welfare. 
Understanding WTP on the part of beneficiaries is only one piece of information 
necessary to assess the feasibility of implementing a PES mechanism in the Fond D'or 
watershed. Supply-side valuation to understand the costs of service provision, 
landowners' willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-participate in such a 
program is perhaps more important than demand-side valuation. Conducting both 
supply-side and demand-side valuation will help set an appropriate payment level so 
that the payment exceeds the benefit from the next best alternative land use (or 
behavior won’t change) and less than the value to downstream users (or they won’t 
pay). 
Household WTP represents one potential financing mechanism for a PES 
scheme. However, we should examine other potential financing sources for a PES 
mechanism for the likelihood that they will be able to secure sufficient funds at any 
given time as well as to make financing self-sustaining into the future. This includes 
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private payment mechanisms through tourism, hydroelectric companies, or water 
bottling operations, as well as public payment mechanisms. 
This research, being exploratory in nature, provides insight into the current 
condition of drinking water in the Fond D’or watershed and residents’ attitudes towards 
potential environmental improvement programs. Anecdotal evidence from the surveys 
reveals that the condition of drinking water is a highly controversial issue in the 
communities and, overall, residents have an unfavorable view of WASCO. Despite 
these negative feelings towards WASCO, and the general opinion that WASCO or the 
government should be responsible for addressing the current situation, the majority of 
respondents are WTP. This information can be of use to policy makers who will be 
evaluating the costs and benefits of various policy alternatives that could cause changes 
in welfare. 
The second article, “A Methodological Approach to Constructing Payments for 
Ecosystem Services in the Fond D’or Watershed, Saint Lucia,” provides an overview of 
the biophysical, institutional, and political conditions needed for designing a successful 
watershed PES mechanism. I elaborate on the opportunities and challenges associated 
with PES in the context of Saint Lucia, drawing upon lessons from watershed PES 
arrangements around the globe.  
I begin by recommending an analysis of the watershed, either technical or 
informal, to define the biophysical links between land use and water quality. 
Understanding these links will lead to identification of the land use best thought to 
deliver the ecosystem services of interest and the degree of land use change required to 
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meet the environmental goals. After the assessment and identification of ideal land use, 
we can then identify priority sites for conservation interventions. I discuss the role that 
the PES principles additionality and conditionality play in the initial stages of PES 
design. 
Next, I recommend estimating the costs of ecosystem service provision. The 
costs of ecosystem service provision are the costs associated with implementing the 
ideal land use, known as implementation costs, and opportunity costs, which are the 
foregone benefits of the alternative land use. Agricultural land use in the Fond D’or 
watershed consists mostly of banana and other fruit tree plantations and root crops like 
yam and dasheen. According to recent national data compiled by the Saint Lucia 
Ministry of Agriculture, the annual opportunity cost per acre of yams and dasheen is 
EC $32,418 ($12,142 US). In this step, I emphasize the importance of understanding 
farmer and landowner attitudes towards participation in a PES mechanism and their 
WTA compensation for taking land out of production; this is critical, as participation in 
a payment scheme is voluntary. Land tenure in Saint Lucia will also determine whether 
a PES scheme is feasible. A legal title to the land will determine which landowners are 
involved in a PES transaction and the logistics of the approach 
After investigating the providers of ecosystem services, I turn to the 
beneficiaries of the ecosystem services provided by a watershed. Beneficiaries include 
stakeholders from the public and private sector and the local, regional, and global scale. 
Once we have identified the beneficiaries across all scales, we can determine which 
group has the greatest incentive to pay for the alteration of landowners' decisions. The 
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household WTP survey discussed in Chapter 2 focused on residents as one group of 
beneficiaries and utilized WASCO as a broker in a monopsonic transaction between the 
buyers (residents) and the sellers (farmers). This is one potential arrangement. We 
should determine the maximum WTP for each group of beneficiaries; the "price" of the 
payment results from a political negotiation between the buyers and sellers.  
A variety of financing options are available to support a mechanism, as 
demonstrated by payment schemes around the world. I evaluate the results of the 
household WTP survey discussed in Chapter 2 in terms of a potential funding source in 
a private payment mechanism financed by increased water users’ fees. Using data from 
another UVM study, I discuss a private payment mechanism that involves stakeholders 
from the tourism industry as the buyer(s). Several Caribbean islands, including Saint 
Lucia, currently fund protected areas and marine management through policy measures 
aimed at tourists. Given the contribution of reef ecosystems to Saint Lucia's economy, 
currently estimated at $91 million US, tourism, Saint Lucia’s primary economic 
activity represents a larger financial contribution to a payment mechanism than do 
domestic water users, as well as a self-sustaining financing mechanism. Given SIDS’ 
unique topography that directly links ridges to reefs, funds allocated for watershed 
improvement have a great to chance of positively impacting downstream reef 
ecosystems. 
The Government of Saint Lucia is also a potential source of funding for a public 
payment mechanism. Such a program could be of interest to the government because 
potable water is an issue of public importance and has direct impacts on public health 
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and labor productivity. A recent report by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
asserts that the global economic return of investing in drinking water and sanitation is 
10-fold; this means that individual countries, such as Saint Lucia, would likely see 
returns for their own countrywide efforts. With a government-funded health care 
program in Saint Luica, the costs of a PES mechanism could be also considered a 
preventative health measure that will perhaps save money on state health care 
expenditures and increase labor productivity in the long term. 
Tropical forested watersheds provide a multiplicity of ecosystem services and 
beneficiaries at a variety of geographic and temporal scales enjoy the flow of those 
services; therefore, a PES mechanism can facilitate a payment for a bundle of services, 
rather than a singular service. Bundling services is one way to ensure sustainable 
funding for a PES mechanism. 
Lastly, I discuss the legal and institutional framework necessary for the success 
of a payment mechanism. Examples where PES mechanisms are effective or promising 
all exhibit strong institutional conditions. For developing countries, where governance 
is low and social and institutional developments are emerging, a functioning legal and 
institutional system may be the limiting factor to implementing a payment mechanism. 
Institutions, whether formal or informal, must be capable of reaching arrangements 
with service providers, monitor contracts, manage and disburse funds, determine 
conditionality, and enforce penalties for violating the rules. Relying on established 
institutions will help keep transaction costs at a minimum. I recommend an institutional 
analysis in the Fond D'or watershed to increase understanding of existing institutional 
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capacity, interest, and influence, while helping negotiators decide which parties need to 
be involved in the payment scheme and in which roles. The institutional analysis will 
identify how institutions link to, and influence, buyers and sellers of watershed services 
and highlight alterations to the institutional structure needed for a payment scheme to 
function properly. 
In Chapter 3, I submit that payments are a potential policy approach for the 
IWCAM program in Saint Lucia. I acknowledge the site- and context-specific nature of 
PES and the challenges and limitations associated with this approach. I outline the steps 
to the creation of a payment scheme and recommend that the managing organization 
take these steps in a logical and consistent manner. For the IWCAM program in the 
Fond D’or watershed of Saint Lucia, best bets for developing a payment mechanism 
involve developing a local or regional transaction for water quality, utilizing existing 
institutions with the technical and financial resources and political will to act as 
intermediaries. WASCO has the financial and legal authority to act as an intermediary, 
as well as a payment collection system currently in place. However, public support and 
trust could be a barrier to success if using WASCO as an intermediary in a payment 
scheme. 
This thesis reinforces the need for innovative environmental policies in 
developing nations for both environmental health and human welfare. Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) are particularly vulnerable to environmental degradation and 
serve to benefit greatly from new policy approaches. Given that regulatory approaches 
have commonly failed to ameliorate negative environmental and social feedback loops, 
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payments represent a promising intervention. While not a “silver bullet” for solving 
environmental problems, it is an approach worth considering in the face of such high 
stakes. The goal of this body of literature is to contribute one piece of research 
necessary to understand the feasibility of PES in the context of the Fond D’or 
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APPENDIX A: Household WTP Survey 
 
Location: ________________________                    Respondent # ________  






1. a) In your opinion, is there is a problem with drinking water in the Mabouya 
Valley? (Circle one) 
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ Do not know (DK) 4□ Refused   
If no, skip to Q#2 
b) Who or what is causing this problem?  
__________________________________________________________________ 
2. What type(s) of water supply does your household use (Check all that apply): 
1□ WASCO  2□ Storage tank 3□ Creek/Stream  4□ Bottled  
5 Other:_________ 
3. a) Do you store WASCO water in drums or tanks? 
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK)  4□ Refused   
 
b) If so, how many? _________________________________________________ 
 
4. Please sketch your household’s water usage from each water source indicated 
above. Please do one sketch for each activity list below: 
 
We are students at the University of Vermont interested in the condition of water in 
the Fond D’Or watershed. We are working with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries of St. Lucia to research this issue. We are conducting a short survey on 
the value of water to households within the watershed. Participation is voluntary and 




























 Please answer a few questions about your household’s water usage: 
 Method Times/Week 
Length of time 
(min) 
Toilet 
 # Yes No 
N/A N/A Flush    
Pit    
Laundry Machine 
Yes No 
    
By hand     
Showers 
 
 Yes No 
  
Inside   
Outside   
Garden 
Bucket Hose Other 
     
 
If using WASCO water, continue to Q#5. 
If not using WASCO water, skip to Q #10. 
 
The next few questions ask about your satisfaction with the quality of water and 
quantity of water. When we mention quality of water, we are referring to the 
cleanliness of the water. When we mention quantity of water, we are referring to the 
amount of water you receive. 
 
5. How would you rate your overall satisfaction with the quality (cleanliness) of the 
water you receive: 
1□ Very satisfied  2□ Satisfied 3□ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
4□ Unsatisfied 5□ Very unsatisfied  6□ DK  7□ Refused  




6. a) Is the quality of water that you receive suitable for your household needs?  
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused  
 If no, continue to b. If yes, skip to Q#7  
 b) Please list the uses for which the water is unsuitable: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. How would you rate your overall satisfaction with the quantity (amount) of the 
water you receive: 
1□ Very satisfied  2□ Satisfied  3□ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
4□ Unsatisfied     5□ Very unsatisfied  6□ DK   7□ Refused  
  Please describe:  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. a) Is the water supply sufficient to meet your household needs? 
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused  
 
b) Are there certain times of year when you don’t have enough water? 
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused   
        If no, skip to Q#9. 
c)  If yes, when____________________________________ 
 
9. a) In your opinion, is the monthly cost of your water service fair for the amount of 
water you receive? 
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused   
If no, please explain:  
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
b)  In your opinion, is the monthly cost of your water service fair for the cleanliness 
of the water you receive? 
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1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused 
If no, please explain: 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Do you pay water bill every month? 
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ Sometimes 4□ DK 5□ Refused  
 
11. On average, how much are you charged for water services a month? 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Please consider the following scenario: Healthy forests provide many public 
benefits; forests provide consistent water supply, flood and drought control and 
wildlife habitat. A program is being considered for forest re-growth in the Fond D’ 
Or watershed. In this program, several acres of land would be reforested upstream 
to protect a clean source of water for future use. I would like to remind you that this 
program does not currently exist; we are gathering this information to be used in 
developing programs for water service improvement.  
 
a) Would you be willing to pay an additional amount on your monthly water bill 
to support a program that reforests land upstream to protect a water source?  
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused 






c) If your water condition improved in the short-term, would you be willing to 
pay extra on your water bill to support such a program? 
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused 
If no, skip to Q #11 
d) Would you be willing to pay $1.50 EC more on your monthly water bill?  
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused  
 If yes, continue to c. If no, skip to Q #11.  
e) Would you be willing to pay $3.00 EC more?     
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused  
 If yes, continue to d. If no, skip to Q #11.  
f) ……………………………...$4.50 EC more?    
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused   
If yes, continue to e. If no, skip to Q #11.  
g) ……………………………...$6.00 EC more?    
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused  
 If yes, continue to f. If no, skip to Q #11.  
h) ……………………………….$7.50 EC more?    
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused   
If yes, continue to g. If no, skip to Q #11.  
i) ……………………………….$9.00 EC more?    
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused   
If yes, continue to h. If no, skip to Q #11.  
j) ……………………………….$10. 50 EC more?    
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused   
If yes, continue to i. If no, skip to Q #11.  
k) ……………………………….$12.00 EC more?    
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1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused   
If yes, continue to j. If no, skip to Q #11j.  
l) ……………………………….$13.50 EC more?     
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused   
If yes, continue to k. If no, skip to Q #11.  
m) ……………………………….$15.00 EC more?    
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused   
If yes, continue to I. If no, skip to Q #11.  
n) Would you be willing to pay more than $15.00 EC? 




13. Do you think landowners should be compensated for participating in a program that 
would require them to take land out of agricultural production to allow for forest re-
growth? 
1□ Yes  2□ No  3□ DK  4□ Refused 
  If No, please explain (who should compensate them)? 
________________________________________________________________ 
   
14. Who do you think should be responsible for addressing water problems in this area? 
Response:_________________________________________________________ 
 
Finally, I have a few questions to ask about your household: 
 
15. How do you dispose of household wastewater? 





16. How many adults (age 18 and above) live in your household? 
__________________ 
 
17. How many children (under age 18) live in your household? 
____________________ 
 
18. In what year were you born? _______________________  
 
19. What is the highest level of education that you, or someone in your household, have 
completed? 
1□ Primary 2□ Secondary    3□ Tertiary    4□ Other_________________ 
 




21. a) What is your occupation? ____________________________________________ 
 
b) Other occupations in household: ________________________________________ 
 
22. Approximately, what is your average monthly household income (before taxes)? 
___________________ 
Use below ranges if necessary: 
1□ 0-499  8□ 3500-3999 
2□ 500-999  9□ 4000-4499 
3□ 1000-1499  10□ 4500-4999 
4□ 1500-1999  11□ 5000-5499 
5□ 2000-2499  12□ 5500-5999 





20) (INTERVIEWER DON’T ASK) 





Thank you for your time today. We appreciate your participation in this research 
study. 
